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Abstract 
 
Economic reform that began in 1978 became a landmark in the evolution of the 
Chinese economy. The Chinese economy then gradually transferred from a planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy. I mainly focus on China’s business cycles and 
monetary policy after 1978 in this paper. 
I use GDP growth to measure the Chinese business cycle. Instead of the level of 
GDP, the business cycles in the thesis I am talking about are ups and downs in the rate of 
growth.  
In Chapter Two, I illustrated all five business cycles which have occurred over the 
past 30 years. I also introduced some of China’s financial background in Chapter Three, 
including institutional condition, banking system, economic reform and existing 
problems. This background introduction gives a clearer picture of China’s financial 
situation and implementation of monetary policy. In Chapter Four, I analyzed some 
aspects of China’s monetary policy such as the credit plan, interest rate, and exchange 
rate. Chapter Five discussed China’s inflation situation and some relevant monetary 
policy decisions. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
China had a planned economy from 1949 to 1977. Economic reform that began in 
1978 became a landmark in the evolution of the Chinese economy. The Chinese 
economic reform began in December 1978 by reformists within the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) led by Deng Xiaoping.The Chinese economy then gradually transferred 
from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy.  
I use GDP growth to measure the Chinese business cycle in this paper. Boom time 
happens when GDP growth rate goes up. That’s because after economic reform, China’s 
GDP growth rate has always been positive. So instead of the level of GDP, the business 
cycles in the thesis I am talking about are ups and downs in the rate of growth.  
China experienced five business cycles between 1978 and 2008. With the deepening 
of reform, the pattern of the Chinese business cycle changed gradually. The amplitude of 
business cycles was smaller and the fluctuation of the economy was less volatile with 
high GDP growth rate. Decentralization was a very important policy in Chinese 
economic reform. According to our research, the trigger of the Chinese business cycle 
was gradually transferred from central government to local government. Through 
economic reform, China retained its central bank while allowing private enterprise. Not 
only has the economic system changed but there have also been improvements in 
investment and foreign trade that have impacted China's economy significantly. We do 
2 
realize that China has achieved impressive progress during economic reform. Huge 
progress can be largely attributed to economic policies China has implemented. But 
within this progress, we identified many issues. The policy efficiency and problems can 
be highly related to China’s financial conditions. In Chapter Three, I focus on the 
Institutional Conditions of Monetary policy in China. I analyze China’s financial 
organization, including the reform process and structure of the banking system. During 
China’s business cycle analysis, economic policy is one of the most important factors. In 
this thesis, I mainly focus on China’s monetary policy including the credit plan, interest 
rate policy, and exchange rate policy which are discussed in Chapter Four. Chapter Five 
is about the causes of inflation and the ability of monetary policy to deal with inflation. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BUSINESS CYCLES IN CHINA 
The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and had a planned 
economy. Economic reform took place in 1978 and is a landmark of evolution of the 
Chinese economy. Chinese economic reform was began in December 1978 by reformists 
within the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Deng Xiaoping.The Chinese 
economy then gradually transferred from a planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy. 
Five Business Cycles after 1978 
According to the official data reported in Table 1, the Chinese economy experienced 
five business cycles between 1978 and 2008.The first cycle started in 1978 and lasted 
until 1981. The second business cycle lasted 4 years, from 1982 to 1986; the third cycle 
started in 1987 and lasted until 1990; the fourth cycle lasted nine years from 1990 to1999; 
the fifth cycle started in 2000. We can define Chinese business cycles based on the GDP 
growth rate. We can see that there were peaks happened in 1984, 1987, 1992 and there 
were troughs happened in 1981, 1986, 1990 and 1999. 
China GDP Growth rates 
year GDP
GDP 
growth 
rate 
Fixed 
invest
ment 
fixed 
invest
ment 
year GDP 
GDP 
Grow
th 
Fixed 
Invest
ment 
Fixed 
invest
ment 
 4 
growt
h rate
rate growt
h rate
1978 3645 11.7% 
  
1994 48198 
13.1
% 
16370 
31.4
% 
1979 4063 7.6% 
  
1995 60794 
10.9
% 
20019 
22.3
% 
1980 4546 7.8% 
  
1996 71177 
10.0
% 
22974 
14.8
% 
1981 4892 5.2% 961.00
 
1997 78973 9.3% 24941 8.6% 
1982 5323 9.1% 
1200.4
0 
24.9
% 
1998 84402 7.8% 28406 
13.9
% 
1983 5963 10.9% 
1369.0
6 
14.1
% 
1999 89677 7.6% 29855 5.1% 
1984 7208 15.2% 
1832.8
7 
33.9
% 
2000 99215 8.4% 32918 
10.3
% 
1985 9016 13.5% 
2543.1
9 
38.8
% 
2001 109655 8.3% 37213 
13.1
% 
1986 
1027
5 
8.8% 
3120.6
0 
22.7
% 
2002 120333 9.1% 43500 
16.9
% 
1987 
1205
9 
11.6% 
3791.6
9 
21.5
% 
2003 135823 
10.0
% 
55567 
27.7
% 
1988 
1504
3 
11.3% 
4753.8
0 
25.4
% 
2004 159878 
10.1
% 
70477 
26.8
% 
1989 
1699
2 
4.1% 
4410.3
8 
-7.2% 2005 183217 9.9% 88774 
26.0
% 
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1990 
1866
8 
3.8% 
4517.0
0 
2.4% 2006 211923 
11.6
% 
109998 
23.9
% 
1991 
2178
1 
9.2% 
5594.5
0 
23.9
% 
2007 265810 
11.9
% 
137324 
24.8
% 
1992 
2692
3 
14.2% 
8080.0
9 
44.4
% 
2008 314045 9.0% 172828 
25.9
% 
1993 
3533
4 
14.0% 
12457.
88 
54.2
%      
Table 1 China GDP Growth Rates (1978-2008) 
（sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China） 
 
Figure 1 GDP Growth Rate (1978-2008) 
（sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China） 
As we can see from Table 1 and Figure 1, the first three cycles are very short in 
length.  The first three business cycles lasted four years, five years and four years 
respectively. The duration became longer after 1990. The length of the fourth business 
cycle was nine years. The length of the fifth cycle was longer than nine years. Also, the 
shape of the last two business cycles became flatter and less volatile. 
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The First Business Cycle:1978-1981 
According to Figure1, the length of the first business cycle was four years. The 
government’s policy at that time was intended to introduce a market economy to the 
current planned economy. This was the first business cycle after economic reform. 
Although market economy policies had been introduced into the economy, the planned 
economy still played the main role during this business cycle. Reform policies during this 
period were mainly for rural areas. Development began in the agriculture industry. 
Improvement of agriculture ameliorated a serious imbalance among agriculture, light 
industry and heavy industry in the composition of the economy. 
In the meantime, political stability has increased since 1977. Investment also 
increased in 1977 and reached its peak in 1978. During The Third Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the Party, government introduced the slogan “adjust, reform, 
amend, improve”. In order to drive economic growth, government arbitrarily invested 
heavily in industry. Investment soared but unfortunately, the stimulation of investment 
failed due to the bold investment target and lack of consideration. The economy ended up 
with high inflation and financial deficits. Poor development of the primary industry and 
the third industry with a fast growth of industry induced an imbalanced economic 
development. In 1978 and 1979, fixed investment reached 69.936 billion RMB and 74.59 
billion RMB which corresponds to an increase of 4.58 percent and 6.65 percent, 
respectively. In the same period, the fiscal deficit grew from 17 billion RMB in 1979 and 
12.7 billion RMB in 1980.In order to finance this unaffordable investment, the 
government forced the People's Bank of China to issue 13.4 billion RMB. The CPI 
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soared 6% in 1980. In 1981, the government changed the economic target from 
developing industry to eliminating the fiscal deficit. Fixed investment dropped by 
10.51% percent to 66.751 billion RMB. 
In this period, state-owned enterprises began to have the power to decide their own 
business strategy. This reform improved the competitive strength and profitability of 
state-owned enterprises. Government also increased the procurement price of agricultural 
by-products in order to improve the income of farmers. Although these policies benefited 
the expansion of the economy, the financial burden of the government became severe. 
The Second Business Cycle: 1982-1986 
The second business cycle started in 1982 and ended in 1986. As we can see in 
Figure1, the peak of GDP growth rate reached 15.2% in 1984 during this business cycle. 
Expansion started in 1982 and lasted until 1984. Depression also lasted two years, from 
1985 to 1986. The fluctuation during this period was not very volatile which means the 
economy of China during this business cycle was comparatively stable.  
Investment kept expanding during this business cycle. Since 1982, fixed investment 
was greater than 100 billion RMB. Because investment grew so rapidly, the economy 
became overheated in 1984. According to the Statistical Report of National Economy and 
Social Development in 1985 issued by the National bureau of Statistics of China, the total 
demand soared and become unsustainable. Total demand exceeded total supply. Imports 
also expanded rapidly. The CPI rose to 9.3% in 1985. In 1986, in order to stabilize the 
economy, government decided to tighten investments. Investment dropped in 1986. 
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Since the Chinese economy changed from a planned economy to a market economy, 
the total salary in the entire economy started to increase. Consumption began to play an 
important role in this business cycle. 
Year 
 
Consumption 
(100 million) 
Consumption 
growth rate GDP 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
Salary salary 
growth 
rate (100 million 
RMB) 
1981 2627.9 12.73% 4892 5.2 820 6.16%
1982 2902.9 10.46% 5323 9.1 882 7.56%
1983 3231.1 11.31% 5963 10.9 934.6 5.96%
1984 3742 15.81% 7208 15.2 1133.4 21.27%
1985 4687.4 25.26% 9016 13.5 1383 22.02%
1986 5302.1 13.11% 10275 8.8 1659.7 20.01%
Table 2 Consumption and Salary Growth Rate（1981-1986） 
（sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China） 
As GDP grew, consumption in this business cycle also increased tremendously. The 
growth rate of consumption reached 25.26% in 1985. But the total supply of the Chinese 
economy didn’t match the growth of consumption and income. The main problem during 
the second business cycle was that the total demand exceeded the total supply: fixed 
investment was overheated; purchasing power exceeded stock supply; the level of 
imports increased too quickly. The CPI grew rapidly.  
Government implemented a new policy in the rural area in 1981. Family Contract 
Responsibility System replaced the old public-owned agriculture economy in the rural 
area.  Local managers became responsible for the profit and losses of the enterprise. This 
privatization of agriculture started at the beginning of the reform. Compared with 
agriculture, the industrial sector began to privatize in 1990s. After handing in a quota of 
output to the government, farmers could keep the rest of their output as private property. 
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Chinese agriculture entered a boom. Private enterprises and town and village enterprises 
(TVEs) expanded rapidly. Since 1979, governments have pointed out that TVEs are one 
important part in the economy. The Regulation of Town and Village Enterprises 
Development Problems which was enacted in 1979 enacted a series of policies to support 
the TVE’s development, including low or no taxes, subsidies, low interest rate loans, etc. 
Banks started to play an important role. Enterprise investment was financed by State 
funds.  Bank loans replaced a large part of state funds and became the main financing 
channel for enterprises investment. A significant expansion in loans also contributed to 
the overheated economy. 
Industry reached an 18% growth rate in 1985, much greater than the government’s 
8% target. In order to support the high growth of industry, China had to increase the 
import of materials. This unexpected increase of imports caused a 1.27 billion RMB trade 
deficit. (Liu Jiangyao, 2009) 
The Third Business Cycle: 1987-1990 
The third business cycle lasted from 1987 to 1990. Expansion was recorded in 1987 
and 1988, and the depression started in 1989 and lasted until 1990. During this business 
cycle, the average GDP growth rate was 7.8%, salary increased 7.5% and the average 
growth rate of agricultural and industry output was 11%. Despite the rapid growth of the 
Chinese economy, it still faced many serious problems. During 1986 and 1987, the loans 
for fixed investment increased by 43% which was much higher than the national income 
growth rate of 32%. The cash that banks used to pay salary and personal expenses in 
1987 was 40.6% higher than in 1985. (Liu Jiangyao, 2005). The economy was overheated. 
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Inflation became serious. On the other hand, the average growth rate of agriculture in this 
cycle was 4.2%, whereas the average industry growth rate was 16.9%. The average 
amount of grain per-capita dropped from 395.5 kilograms in1984 to 376 kilograms in 
1987. This insufficient food supply induced a rising grain price. There was serious 
imbalance between agriculture and industry. In the same period, basic industry and 
infrastructure were poor. Train were overloaded and coal and steel were in short supply. 
Because of this serious imbalance in the economy, the Chinese government made a 
policy adjustment in 1988. China loosened the credit policy as they assumed that the 
main factor inducing the increase in the CPI was the increased prices of food. Inflation 
became more serious as the CPI reached 11.8 in 1988. Serious inflation induced a panic. 
People rushed to supermarkets to snap up food and went to banks to withdrawal cash. 
The government began to tighten monetary policy in 1989. The CPI went down gradually. 
Supply and demand became comparatively stable. 
The Forth Business Cycle: 1991-1999 
This business cycle lasted 8 years. Expansion began in 1991 and lasted through 1992. 
The depression lasted 7 years from 1993 to 1999. Compared to the previous business 
cycle, the duration of the fourth business cycle was nearly two times as long, the average 
GDP level was comparatively high and volatility was low. This means that during this 
period, the Chinese economy was relatively stable.  
During 1989 to 1991, China tightened both monetary policy and fiscal policy. 
Budgets and investment decreased and prices dropped. The entire national economy 
suffered from recession. The profit of enterprises decreased. Government faced a huge 
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fiscal deficit (The report of performance of budget plan in 1991 and the drafted budget in 
1992, 1992). In order to improve the economy, The Chinese government implemented 
active fiscal policy to stimulate industry and social demand. As we can see in Table 1, 
fixed investment increased by 23.85% in 1991. In the meantime, government also 
devaluated RMB to increase exports and improve international trade. In 1991 the 
economy began to grow at a much more rapid rate. GDP growth rate rose to 9.2% in 
1991; agriculture increased by 3%, and industry grew by 14.2%. 
In 1992, President Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour speech pointed out that 
technology and science needed to be boosted, and reforms needed to be implemented 
more rapidly. In 1992 GDP growth rate rose to 23.61%, fixed investment increased 
44.43% and industry increased 20.8 %.( statistical report of national economy and social 
development in 1992, 1993) 
The recession during this business cycle started in 1993 and lasted 7 years. 
Compared to the first 3 business cycles, the recession in the fourth business cycle was 
much less severe. The overheated economy induced unstable fluctuation in the economic 
system. Overinvestment led to a high unsustainable industry growth rate, high price level 
and an insufficient of materials and natural resources. The Chinese government adopted 
new policies immediately to cool down the economy. Reform included: separation of the 
central bank from commercial banks, encouragement of the development of private 
enterprises, adoption of a tax sharing system, and implementation of different policies in 
different industries. During a 4-year adjustment, the investment growth rate dropped and 
the CPI returned to a comparatively low level. Most importantly, the economy kept 
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growing at a fast pace. With this low CPI and high economic growth rate, Chinese 
economy finished its “soft landing”. 
The fifth business cycle: 2000-2008 
The duration of the fifth business cycle was more than 9 years. Expansion lasted 8 
years. Economic growth rate reached 11.9% in 2007 and recession started in 2008. The 
economic fluctuations were less volatile during this business cycle. The amplitude of the 
business cycle was comparatively small. GDP level was high. These characteristic 
indicated that the development of Chinese economy was healthy and that the expansion 
of different industries was balanced. Macro policy was the main factor which affected 
this business cycle. 
The Chinese government carried out a pro-active fiscal and monetary policy to 
create economic incentives after the Asian financial crisis. Government issued 864.3 
billion Yuan in treasury bonds at the end of 2004. Agriculture, forestry, transportation, 
ecology etc. had improved rapidly. In the meantime, government lowered the tax rate to 
stimulate investment, consumption and foreign trade. Ameliorating income distribution 
also increased social demand. The Economy grew very fast between 2000 and 2004. The 
government implemented a steady monetary and fiscal policy instead of a pro-active 
economic policy after 2004. Economic policy changed because the Chinese economy did 
not suffer from either insufficient demand or deflation after 2004. The government 
decided to adopt a prudent fiscal policy to avoid an overheated economy. The counter-
cyclical economic policies implemented by the government stabilized the economy. This 
was the main reason that the fifth business cycle was less volatile. 
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 The typical characteristics of Chinese business cycles 
Based on the GDP growth rate, we use “trough-to-trough” measure to calculate the 
duration of business cycles. China used to have a planned economy before 1978. The 
government controlled the whole economy. Government investment led to economic 
fluctuation. The duration of business cycles was a function of the economic plan 
implemented by the government. 
Year 
GDP 
(100 million) 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
Year 
GDP 
(100 million) 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
1952 679 1965 1717.203777 17.98% 
1953 824.189657 21.38% 1966 1873.078613 9.08% 
1954 859.384232 4.27% 1967 1780.281489 -4.95% 
1955 910.784418 5.98% 1968 1730.164346 -2.82% 
1956 1028.981289 12.98% 1969 1945.781118 12.46% 
1957 1069.290064 3.92% 1970 2261.324065 16.22% 
1958 1308.20906 22.34% 1971 2435.25676 7.69% 
1959 1440.363809 10.10% 1972 2530.224149 3.90% 
1960 1457.473017 1.19% 1973 2733.353749 8.03% 
1961 1220.937307 -16.23% 1974 2803.74257 2.58% 
1962 1151.239035 -5.71% 1975 3013.110833 7.47% 
1963 1236.367202 7.39% 1976 2961.472658 -1.71% 
1964 1455.539374 17.73% 1977 3221.051773 8.77% 
Table 3 GDP Growth Rate (1952-1977) 
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Figure 2 GDP Growth Rate (1952-1977) 
According to Wenxian Gao who mentioned in the “ A Discussion about Business 
Cycle Fluctuation after 1949” , Chinese business cycles between 1949 and 1976 can be 
divided into some smaller business cycles: 1953-1957; 1958-1961, 1962-1967, 1968-
1972 and 1973-1976. I selected the date from 1953 to 1976 because the Chinese economy 
suffered from an extremely volatile business cycle from 1953 to 1976. There are 3 main 
phases during this period: 1953-1961, 1962-1967, 1968-1976. During the first phase, 
from 1953 to 1961, the GDP growth increased 18.94% in one year; it soared from 3.92% 
in 1957 to 22.34% in 1958. In 1961, the GDP growth rate dropped by -16.28% which was 
38.62% lower than its peak.    During the second business cycle, the highest point was 
17.98%, which was 22.93% higher than the lowest point. In the third phase, there were 3 
small cycles (1968-1972, 1972-1974, 1974-1976). Nearly every cycle during this period 
lasted only two years. At this time, the market economy began to replace the planned 
economy. Although the Chinese economy had not gotten rid of the planned economy 
altogether, the market had become an increasingly important factor which affected the 
state of the economy.  
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Comparing the business cycles before and after Chinese economic reform, we find 
some consistent changes in the business cycles after 1978: 
First, the amplitude of business cycles was smaller and the fluctuation of the 
economy was less volatile. The economy was much more stable than it was before the 
economic reform.   
President Deng Xiaoping pointed out during the economic reform that economic 
development must be the most important strategy of China. Political movement was no 
longer the crucial factor of economic fluctuation. Government took economic 
development seriously and the Chinese economic environment became stable. In the 
meantime, the effect of agriculture on business cycle was no longer as important as it was 
before 1978. Business cycles before economic reform in China were more like 
“agriculture cycles”. Before 1978, famine was one of the most serious problems in China. 
The food supply was insufficient. Boom time usually happened in the years after a good 
harvest. The Economy slumped after a poor harvest. Chinese agriculture developed 
rapidly through economic reform. The food supply was no longer a serious problem after 
1984. China’s agriculture development eliminated the agriculture factor from the list of 
“factors that affect business cycles”. The reaction time by the government to the 
economic movement was shorter and the policy that government implemented was better. 
For example: in 1988, China suffered from severe inflation. The CPI reached 11.8%. 
Government neither took action in time nor made an effort to guide people through the 
inflation. Then the public began to doubt the ability of government to solve the economic 
problem and panicked. People flooded the markets with panic purchase of necessities like 
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oil and salt, purchasing enough for a year. In order to control inflation, the Chinese 
government arbitrarily increased interest rates. This immediately led the economy to 
slump and caused a severe depression. But the situation was much better in 1993 and 
2004. During the depression in the fourth business cycle, China successfully finished its 
first “soft landing”. During the fourth business cycle, the CPI dropped from 24.1% to 
8.3% but GDP maintained a very high growth rate. In 2004, the Chinese economy 
became overheated. Through macro-control, government achieved the second “soft 
landing”. During the fifth business cycle, inflation was moderate and the GDP growth 
rate was under control. 
Second, there is a high growth rate of GDP. The real estate and car industry were two 
representative industries during the structural economic improvement through the 
economic reform. The demand for durable goods increased due to the improvement of 
per-capita GDP. Take real estate as an example; the development of real estate benefits 
many industries, like cement, steel, chemical, coal and ore. All these correlated industries 
become an integrated network and promote one another. The car industry is similar to the 
real estate industry. Since 2002, China has sped up industrialization and urbanization. 
The total demand for real estate and cars has increased dramatically. This improvement 
of the economic structure and changes of demand led to a high growth rate of GDP to 
some extent.   
Although economic reform transformed the Chinese economy from a planned 
economy to a market economy, business cycles in China have still been affected by 
planning. The government is still the main factor that causes business cycles. 
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The Chinese economy changed a lot through 30 years of economic reform. Most of 
the commodity prices have opened and have become market oriented. Private enterprises 
are experiencing a huge development. But the reform is not completed yet. The planned 
economy is still playing a role in the new Chinese economy. For example: 1. State-owned 
enterprises are still the main players in the market. Government is responsible for the 
profits and losses of these state-owned enterprises. Because of that, state-owned 
enterprises are less profit driven and comparatively inefficient. The whole market is not 
efficient as we expect. 2.  Government still controls a large part of the industry, especially 
the financial industry. The main player is still the government. 3. The market mechanism 
is still not complete. Regulations have not been well established. 
Business cycles in China are still affected by the planned economy. More precisely, 
Chinese business cycles are more like “government-induced business cycle”. Boom time 
starts because the Chinese government artificially expands credit. Government increases 
investment in order to develop the economy. This is not a market-oriented result. Huge 
investment leads to an overheated economy. Development is unsustainable, similar to the 
situation Roger Garrison mentioned in the book Capital-Based Macroeconomics. In order 
to control the overheated economy and inflation, government tightens fiscal and 
monetary policy to drag the economy back to normal status. When the economy goes 
down, this process starts again. In China, political power still plays an important role in 
economy. The duration of business cycles are highly correlated to changes in the 
government. 
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Fourth, Local government became one of the most important triggers of Chinese 
business cycles 
The first three business cycles were induced by the central government. China 
started fiscal reform in the 1980s. The central government began its fiscal 
decentralization reform to let the sub national governments have more power in financing 
their needs and gradually build up their accountability. Local government had the right to 
decide their own economic policy and were responsible for their own fiscal revenue. 
Local economic development also became a very important criterion of the performance 
of local government. This reform stimulated a huge local economic development but this 
also led to contentions over capital between sub national governments and a fanaticism of 
pursuing high investment. The trigger of business cycles shifted from central government 
to local governments. 
Some Factors Which Affect Business Cycles 
There are lots of factors which affect Chinese business cycles. In this part, I focus on 
four aspects: The changes to the economic system, investment, the change of economic 
structure and foreign trade. 
The Changes to the Economic System 
The Reform of the Central Bank 
Before 1978, there was only one bank- The People’s Bank of China (PBOC). The 
PBOC was a government-owned bank. It served as both the central bank and a 
commercial bank. Between 1950 and 1978, the PBOC controlled nearly 93% of the total 
financial assets of the country and handled almost all financial transactions (Thomas G. 
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Rawski, p509). In 1978, the PBOC was separated from the government and became a 
autonomous entity. Over the same period, three state-owned banks- Bank of China, 
Construction Bank of China and Agriculture Bank of China took over some of the 
PBOC’s commercial business. Another state-owned bank - The Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China was established in 1984 to take over the rest of the 
commercial transactions of the PBOC. In 1984, the PBOC was formally established as 
the central bank of the People’s Republic of China. The central bank became a useful 
policy tool of government that could affect the economy and business cycles. 
Overinvestment led to an increase of material imports and a huge deficit. The CPI 
increased to 9.3% in 1985. In order to control the inflation, government implemented 
tightened monetary policy through the PBOC. The PBOC increased the requirement of 
reserves and tightened the credit .The PBOC also depreciated the exchange rate of RMB 
and increased the interest rate. Then the growth of industry, investment and prices 
decreased in 1986. The PBOC also played an important role in dealing with high inflation 
in 1988. Implementing countercyclical policy through the PBOC became one of the most 
important tools of the government in adjusting the economy and stabilizing business 
cycles. 
The Development of Private Enterprises 
Before economic reform, all enterprises in China were state-owned. Although state-
owned enterprises still played an important role in the economy, private enterprises 
increased rapidly after the introduction of the market economy. Private industrial 
enterprises expanded with the decrease of state-owned enterprises’ output growth after 
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1978.  In 2006, the output of private industrial enterprises reached 4159.24 billion RMB 
which was 18 times more than the output of state-owned industrial enterprises. The 
market share of state-owned industrial enterprises dropped from 67.6% in 1978 to 5.3% 
in 2006 (Huang Ze-Lin, 2008). One typical characteristic of state-owned enterprises is 
that they do not need to worry about financial budgets or losses because the government 
is responsible for their profits and losses. Under this kind of “soft budget constraint”, the 
investment and consumption demand of the state-owned enterprises are neither 
determined by their business performance nor their money stock. For example, if a state-
owned enterprise suffers from serious loss due to their incompetent products, the 
government will most likely give them financial support in order to avoid bankruptcy. 
Even if a state-owned enterprise does not have money to invest in other fields or to 
expand their output, the government will likely give them financial support. A “soft 
budget constraint” can contradict the market economy mechanism and result in 
inefficiencies and unfairness. Without the unlimited financial support of the government, 
private enterprises find it difficult to survive in the market; especially, private enterprises 
and state-owned enterprises compete with each other in lots of industries in China. With 
unlimited support from the government, State owned enterprises have the advantage over 
private enterprises. This unfair support from government to state-owned enterprises will 
induce the loss of private enterprises’ market share or private enterprises’ bankruptcy. 
Without the pressure of market competition, state-owned enterprises often lose 
significant amounts of government income and increase the government’s fiscal burden. 
These factors explain why the decrease of state-owned industrial enterprises improved 
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the soft budget constraint of government. More importantly, the effect of state-owned 
enterprises on economic fluctuation decreased. The reduction of state-owned enterprises’ 
share avoided the situation in which government would have to take steps to save these 
state-owned enterprises. The economy became much more stable and fluctuation was less 
volatile. Private companies are profit-driven and market-oriented. They have high 
expanded potential and efficiency during the reform. They also have a very strong ability 
to adjust to the market during recessions. They decrease the amplitude of the business 
cycle to some extent as well. That is one of the reasons why the last two business cycles 
in China after 1990 were less volatile than the first three. 
Investment 
Investment is highly correlated with change of GDP in China. 
 
Figure 3 Fixed Investment and GDP growth Rate 
According to the Figure 3 above, the fixed investment growth rate is highly 
correlated with GDP growth rate. Fixed investment is an important trigger of GDP 
expansion. The correlation coefficient between the growth rate of real investment and the 
growth rate of real GNP reached 79.5% from 1979 to 1997. (Cui Youping, 2007) 
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 The fluctuation of investment, especially fixed investment, has largely affected 
economic growth. During the five business cycles in China, fixed investment was always 
the main factor which stimulated economic boom time. When fixed investment increased 
in one industry, it would not only benefit that one industry but also the whole frontier and 
related industry. Once investment increased, industries like cement and steel increased, 
and then drove the development of other related industries. Likewise, when fixed 
investment decreased, the economy would shrink to adjust to the lack of investment. 
Investment also created job opportunities and increased income. Social demand was 
stimulated and consumption increased. In order to satisfy the increase of social need, 
enterprises increased investment again. The expansion continued until the resources 
could not sustain it any longer. 
In the first three business cycles most of the fixed investment was driven by state-
owned enterprises because a large part of the Chinese economy was still planned. Most of 
the investment came from the government. Private investment grew in the last two cycles. 
Government implemented tight fiscal and monetary policy in 1988 because of a high CPI. 
State-owned investment decreased at first. Then, private investment began to decrease in 
1989. Private investment shrunk at a quicker rate than state-owned investment. Private 
investment was much more sensitive to the market than the state-owned investment. 
Once they saw the market going down they would halt investment immediately. 
Government started to increase investment again in 1991. The growth rate of state-owned 
investment was still 10% higher than the private investment growth rate. Until 1993, 
private investment started to soar. The growth rate of private investment reached 72%. 
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During the Asia financial crisis in 1997, government increased state-owned investment to 
expand domestic demand. Unfortunately, few private investments followed because of 
the down time. Huge state-owned investment try to stimulate the market again in 2002, 
private investment followed and the growth rate started to rise again. Private investment 
growth rate increased from 5.1% in 1999 to 46.4% in 2003. State-owned investment 
acted as a market guide. Private investment felt safe entering the market with the guide of 
state-owned investment.  
Changes to economic structure 
Changes to the Structure of Industry 
China divides its economy into three parts: The primary industry is involved in the 
extraction and collection of natural resources, including agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishery, etc.; The secondary industry of an economy is dominated by the 
manufacture of finished products.The secondary industry makes products that are more 
likely to be consumed by individuals, such as the mining industry, manufacturing, 
electricity, gas and water and architecture; The tertiary industry includes all industries 
which do not belong to the primary or secondary industry categories. We can also define 
the tertiary industry as an industry made up of companies that primarily earn revenue 
through providing intangible products and services.Service industry companies are 
involved in retail, transport, distribution, food services, as well as other service-
dominated businesses. An optimal structure of economy can help economy stay in a 
balanced status. In developed countries, such as the US and UK for example, the growth 
rate and employment in primary industry has gradually decreased since the 1970s. The 
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weight of output and employment in developed countries’ secondary industry was 
increasing before the 1960’s but has since begun to decline. The relative weight of the 
tertiary industry has increased in most developed countries since the 1960s. In most of 
the developed countries, the weight of the third industry is now more than 60%. We can 
conclude that during industrialization secondary industry increases and plays a major role 
in economic development. But in the post-industrialization stage, tertiary industry will 
grow and will accompany a decrease in secondary industry. Many criteria like income 
elasticity, productivity, resource efficiency can help economic development by changing 
the industry structure. With the development of the economy and industry structure, the 
weight of the primary industry decreases and that of the tertiary industry increases. After 
economic reform, the structure of the Chinese economy changed significantly. In 
alignment with the conclusion, as we can see in the Figure 4, the weight of the primary 
industry decreased significantly after 1978. The secondary industry fluctuated over the 
past 30 years, but kept its weight between 40% and 50%. The tertiary industry grew 
rapidly. The weight of the tertiary industry expanded from 21.63% in 1979 to 41.82% in 
2008. 
Year 
Primary 
Industry  
(%) 
Secondary 
Industry 
(%) 
The 
Tertiary 
Industry  
(%) 
Year
Primary 
Industry 
(%) 
Secondary 
Industry  
(%) 
The 
Tertiar
y 
Industr
y  
(%) 
1978 28.19 47.88 23.94 1994 19.86 46.57 33.57
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1979 31.27 47.1 21.63 1995 19.96 47.18 32.86
1980 30.17 48.22 21.6 1996 19.69 47.54 32.77
1981 31.88 46.11 22.01 1997 18.29 47.54 34.17
1982 33.39 44.76 21.85 1998 17.56 46.21 36.23
1983 33.18 44.38 22.44 1999 16.47 45.76 37.77
1984 32.13 43.09 24.78 2000 15.06 45.92 39.02
1985 28.44 42.89 28.67 2001 14.39 45.15 40.46
1986 27.14 43.72 29.14 2002 13.74 44.79 41.47
1987 26.81 43.55 29.64 2003 12.8 45.97 41.23
1988 25.7 43.79 30.51 2004 13.39 46.22 40.38
1989 25.1 42.83 32.06 2005 12.12 47.37 40.51
1990 27.12 41.34 31.54 2006 11.11 47.95 40.94
1991 24.53 41.79 33.68 2007 10.77 47.34 41.89
1992 21.79 43.46 34.76 2008 10.73 47.45 41.82
1993 19.71 46.57 33.72      
Table 4 Major Trends in Chinese Industry 
 
 
Figure 4 Major Trends in Chinese Industry 
At the beginning of the economic reform, primary industry accounted for 30% of all 
GDP. In 2008, the primary industry had already dropped to 10.73% of total GDP. Then in 
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the years following 1978, primary industry as a percentage of total GDP increased 
because of the family contract responsibility system in the agriculture industry. Policy 
induced the increase in agricultural productivity. Then the size of primary industry began 
to decrease. Aside from the decreased importance of primary industry, the structure of 
primary industry improved. Before economic reform, agriculture was the main part of 
primary industry, accounted for more than 80% of the primary industry. The structure of 
the primary industry became much more diversified after 1978. 
Year 
Total Output 
of Agriculture, 
Forestry, 
Animal 
husbandry and 
Fishery 
Agriculture (%)
Forestry 
(%) 
Animal 
Husbandry 
(%) 
Fisher
y (%) 
1978 139.7 80 3.4 15 1.6
1980 192.26 75.6 4.2 18.4 1.7
1985 361.95 69.2 5.2 22.1 3.5
1989 653.473 62.8 4.4 27.6 5.3
1990 766.21 64.7 4.3 25.7 5.4
1991 815.7 63.1 4.5 26.5 5.9
1992 908.47 61.5 4.7 27.1 6.8
1993 1099.55 60.1 4.6 27.4 8
1994 1575.05 58.2 3.9 29.7 8.2
1995 2034.09 58.4 3.5 29.7 8.4
1996 2235.37 60.6 3.5 26.9 9
1997 2378.84 58.2 3.4 28.7 9.6
 27 
1998 2454.186 58 3.5 28.6 9.9
1999 2451.906 57.5 3.6 28.5 10.3
2000 2491.58 55.7 3.8 29.7 10.9
2001 2617.96 55.2 3.6 30.4 10.8
2002
2739.075
4 
54.5 3.8 30.9 10.8
2003 2969.18 50.1 4.2 32.1 10.6
2004 3623.899 50.1 3.7 33.6 9.9
2005 3945.089 49.7 3.6 33.7 10.2
Table 5 Total Output of Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery 
 
Figure 5 Percentage of Agriculture, Forestry, Animal husbandry and Fishery in the 
Primary Industry 
As we can see in the Table 5 and Figure 5, the relative size of the agriculture 
industry decreased; the percentage of the agriculture industry comprised of forestry 
remained nearly the same; animal husbandry and fishery experienced a burgeoning 
development. In 2005, animal husbandry as a percentage of total agriculture increased 
from 15% in 1978 to 33.7% in 2005; the size of the fishing industry also increased from 
1.6% in 1978 to 10.2% in 2005. This huge change was induced by the change in the 
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consumption structure. According to the increase of income, the demand for diversity of 
food stimulated the development of other primary industries. The diverse and balanced 
development of primary industry evaded volatile fluctuation in primary industry through 
the course of the business cycle. 
During the process of industrialization, the growth of secondary industry drove the 
growth of the growth of the economy. Furthermore, rapid expansion of secondary 
industry was highly correlated with the change of its structure. From 1978 to 2005, the 
output of secondary industry increased from 174.52 billion RMB to 8704.67 billion RMB. 
The annual growth rate reached 11.3%. Secondary industry as a percentage of total 
economic output stabilized around 40% to 50% (China: 30 years of reform and opening-
up, 2008). After economic reform, manufacturing as a percentage of secondary industry 
was very stable. Technology-intensive industries developed rapidly which optimized the 
structure of secondary industry. Secondary industry gradually changed from labor-
intensive and capital-intensive to technology-intensive. Industrial expansion also focused 
on quality as a primary target instead of quantity. The size of the coal, textile, food and 
manufacturing industries decreased significantly. Oil and gas extraction, oil refining 
transportation equipment manufacturing and the manufacturing industry of electronic and 
telecommunications equipment expanded very fast. The development of the 
manufacturing industry of electronic and telecommunications equipment was especially 
impressive. The proportion increased from 6.66% in 1985 to 10.16% in 2004. 
The development of tertiary industry was one of the successes of the economic 
reform. The expansion of tertiary industry was much higher than that of the other two 
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industries. The average annual growth rate of tertiary industry was 10.7%, 1.1% higher 
than the average annual growth rate of GDP. At the beginning of economic reform, the 
tertiary industry was mainly constituted of financial institutions, restaurants, 
transportation and other traditional services industries. Through a 20-year development, 
other service industries, like tourism, consulting, banking, insurance, real estate, 
education, also expanded quickly. The importance of traditional service industries 
dropped while others, such as education, entertainment, public services, real estate and 
public health, increased dramatically.  
The Change to Consumption Structure 
Improvement to employment, housing, education, and income changed the pattern 
of consumption. The main part of the consumption became housing and transportation 
instead of groceries, commodities and clothing. Before economic reform, China had a 
serious constraint of personal credit- all personal expenses would have to be paid with 
personal savings. With the development of the economy, the elasticity of consumption 
demand for large durable consumer goods became very high. During the late 1970s to 
early 1980s, the watch, bicycle, sewing machine, and radio industries expanded 
dramatically. In the late 1980s, the increased demand for televisions, washing machines 
and refrigerators stimulated a fast growth of light industry. After 2002, the auto and real 
estate industries began to develop. From 2002 to 2004, the average growth rate of the real 
estate industry increased to 10.7%. The growth rate of the auto industry reached 89.7% in 
2003(Report of Research on Chinese Economic Cycles, p10). The change in the 
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consumption structure was the result of industrialization, urbanization and economic 
development. 
The Widening Gap Between The Rich and The Poor  
By setting up a model, Yin Heng, Gong Liutang and Zhou Hengfu found out, if the 
beginning status of the economy is a comparatively less developed equalitarianism, 
implementation of “encourage some people to become rich sooner than others” policy 
can accelerate economic growth. But, with the development of economy, increased 
income distribution inequality then starts to dampen the economic growth (Yin Heng, 
Gong Liutang and Zhou Hengfu, 2005, “Income inequality and economic growth: back to 
Kuznets’ assumption” ). Before economic reform, income distribution in China was 
comparatively equal due to the planned economy. During the reform, the government 
chose to let some people and regions prosper before others in the hope that they would 
carry the backward regions. The speed of economic growth increased tremendously. And 
with the high economic growth rate, the inequality of income distribution became severe. 
According to the Report of Research on Chinese Economic Cycles, the Gini coefficient 
was 0.30 in the early 1980s and reached 0.33 in the late 1980s. The Gini coefficient 
became 0.434 in 1994 and increased to 0.458 in 2000. In 2008, the Gini coefficient was 
0.65. Unfortunately, the gap between the rich and poor had been widened. According to 
2006 data, the income of the lowest 10% population was equal to one ninth of the income 
of the highest 10% population in the urban area. In China, the majority of consumers are 
from the middle and low income groups. Analysis and Forecast of Chinese Social 
Circumstance in 2008 pointed out that although the consumption of the high income 
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group is around 1.96 times higher than the national average, this consumption is mainly 
focused on luxury goods. Analysis and Forecast of Chinese Social Circumstance in 2008 
also pointed out that although the middle class had high demand potential, they did not 
have the buying power to match. The percentage of middle class consumer spending as a 
percentage of total consumption continued to decrease. All this suggests the consumption 
of the middle class will significantly affects social demand, which will further affect 
economic growth. Since the fluctuation of China’s business cycle is a reflection of 
economic growth, the inequality of income distribution is a crucial factor in business 
cycle fluctuations. 
Foreign Trade 
During economic reform, Deng Xiaoping committed China to adopt policies that 
promote foreign trade and economic investment. This “open door” policy linked the 
Chinese economy with the international economy. Before economic reform, foreign trade 
was not a significant part of the Chinese economy. From 1953 to 1978, the total volume 
of foreign trade increased from 2.37 billion dollar to 20.64 billion dollar, but Chinese 
foreign trade as a percentage of GDP dropped from 1.23% to 0.75%. Foreign trade was 
overlooked before economic reform. The Chinese government implemented policies to 
stimulate foreign trade after 1978. The growth of foreign trade was higher than the 
growth of GDP. Chinese foreign trade rose in the international rankings from 32nd in 
1978 to 3rd in 2008. The total volume of foreign trade in 2008 reached 2561.6 billion 
dollars. 
Year  Foreign Trade Export Import 
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Ranking Weight Ranking Weight Ranking Weight 
1981 22 1.1 19 1.1 21 1.1 
1982 20 1.1 17 1.2 22 1 
1983 20 1.2 17 1.2 18 1.1 
1984 16 1.4 18 1.4 17 1.4 
1985 11 1.8 17 1.4 11 2.1 
1986 12 1.7 16 1.5 11 2 
1987 17 1.6 16 1.6 14 1.7 
1988 15 1.8 16 1.7 14 1.9 
1989 15 1.8 14 1.7 14 1.9 
1990 16 1.7 15 1.8 18 1.5 
1991 15 2 13 2.1 15 1.8 
1992 11 2.2 11 2.3 13 2.1 
1993 11 2.7 11 2.5 11 2.8 
1994 11 2.9 11 2.9 11 2.8 
1995 11 2.9 11 3 12 2.7 
1996 11 3 11 2.9 12 2.6 
1997 10 2.9 10 3.3 12 2.5 
1998 11 3 9 3.4 11 2.5 
1999 9 3.2 9 3.5 11 2.8 
2000 7 3.6 7 3.9 8 3.4 
2001 6 4 6 4.3 6 3.8 
2002 5 4.7 5 5.1 6 4.4 
2003 4 5.6 4 5.9 3 5.3 
2004 3 6.2 3 6.5 3 5.9 
2005 3 6.7 3 7.3 3 6.1 
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2006 3 7.4 3 8 3 6.4 
2007 3 7.7 2 8.8 3 6.7 
2008 3 8 2 9.4 3 7 
Table 6 Foreign Trade, Exports and Imports 
According to Table 6, the speed of development in foreign trade was tremendous. 
During 1978 to 2008, the average annual growth rate of foreign trade was around 19%, 
nearly two times more than the average growth rate of global international trade. Chinese 
foreign trade increased 124 times in 30 years. 
A lengthy debate exists about the causative relations between the GDP growth rate 
and changes in foreign trade: whether economic growth becomes a trigger of foreign 
trade or an increase of foreign trade stimulates the economic growth. All these viewpoints 
have the assumption that foreign trade and economic growth affect each other. 
JustinYifuLin and Yongjun Li conclude in “A Re-Examination of International Trade’s 
Contribution to China’s Economic Growth” that in the 1990s a near 10% increase in 
export led to a 1% increase in Chinese GDP. This multiplier was lower in the 1980s, 
likely because the relative weight of exports was too small. This number was stabilized at 
around 20% in late 1990s.   
Year 
 Growth Rate 
of Foreign 
Trade 
(%) 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
Year 
 Growth 
Rate of 
Foreign 
Trade 
(%) 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
1978 39.4 11.7 1994 10.91 13.1 
1979 42.1 7.6 1995 18.7 10.9 
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1980 28.95 7.8 1996 3.21 10 
1981 16.39 5.2 1997 12.17 9.3 
1982 -5.43 9.1 1998 -0.37 7.8 
1983 4.78 10.9 1999 11.3 7.6 
1984 22.76 15.2 2000 31.5 8.4 
1985 29.99 13.5 2001 7.46 8.3 
1986 6.09 8.8 2002 21.78 9.1 
1987 11.92 11.6 2003 37.1 10 
1988 24.37 11.3 2004 35.7 10.1 
1989 8.66 4.1 2005 23.2 9.9 
1990 3.36 3.8 2006 22.38 11.6 
1991 17.49 9.2 2007 23.5 11.9 
1992 22.05 14.2 2008 17.8 9 
1993 18.23 14     
Table 7 The Foreign Trade and the GDP 
 
Figure 6 The Foreign Trade and the GDP 
As we can see in Table 7 and Figure 6, the peak of foreign trade was reached in 
1984, 1987, 1992 and 2004. During these years, Chinese GDP also had a very high 
growth rate. On the contrary, when the foreign trade growth rate decreased because of 
economic crisis, the GDP growth rate also dropped significantly. For example, during the 
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economic crisis in 1982, the Chinese foreign trade growth rate decreased from 16.39% in 
1981 to -5.43% in 1982. The GDP growth rate in 1981 was only 5.2%. As a result of the 
Asian financial crisis, foreign trade decreased by -0.37% in 1998. Economy suffered 
from insufficient domestic demand because of the economic downturn. A decrease in 
foreign trade made the situation worse. The GDP growth rate dropped to 7.8% in 1998 
and decreased to 7.6% in 1999. GDP growth is highly correlated with changes in the 
level of foreign trade.   
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CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF MONETARY 
POLICY IN CHINA 
The efficiency of monetary policy is largely determined by the institutional 
backgrounds and conditions of the country. As Yanfen Huang mentioned in The Money 
Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, the necessary institutional preconditions 
for a successful conduct of monetary policy include: (1) Establishing an autonomous 
central bank, which is a prerequisite for creating the central bank’s credibility. (2) Having 
a well-functioning, market-based banking system. (3) Developing an efficient financial 
market. During the 30 years after economic reform, China’s financial system has been 
changed from a monobank system to a two-tier banking system. Government 
implemented policies to cultivate and develop the financial market. In the meantime, 
government also introduced indirect control mechanisms into the monetary policies.  
The Banking System before Economic Reform 
Before economic reform, China’s banking system was a monobank system. The 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) had a monopoly on currency issuance, transaction 
clearing, saving collection and lending for working capital investment. PBOC acted both 
as a central bank and as a commercial bank. Before 1978, the PBOC controlled about 
93% of all financial assets of China (Allen, Franklin & Qian, Jun & Qian, Meijun, 2005). 
The specialized banks—the People’s Construction Bank of China (PCBC) and the Bank 
of China (BOC) were the special departments of the PBOC. During the pre-reform period, 
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enterprises received investment and construction funds in the form of budgetary grants. 
Bank lending was only related to the enterprises’ transitory working capital. The main 
role of the PBOC was that of a cashier for the Ministry of Finance. The conventional 
view of the bank’s role in China in pre-1978 was merely that of a passive or 
accommodating instrument of central planning (Leroy Jin, Monetary Policy and the 
Design of Financial Institutions in China, 1978-90). There was another important 
haracteristic of China’s financial system in the pre-reform period – two separate 
monetary circuits. The currency circuit referred to the transactions of consumption and 
wage payments for the non-state sector; the bank transfer circuit was used to clear 
transactions related to production and investment activities among enterprises and 
institutions. There were strict regulatory barriers between these two circuits before 
economic reform. Before 1978, residents both in the urban and rural area could only use 
cash for payment; enterprises could not withdraw cash from their bank accounts unless 
they obtained approval from the PBOC. Under this financial background, monetary 
authority could easily use a “cash plan” to control the currency flow and implement the 
“credit plan” to manage the bank transfer circuit. 
The Three Stages of the Financial Sector Reform 
The First Phase of the Banking System Reform 1978-1984 
Since economic reform, greater emphasis has been placed on the role of banks and 
monetary policy. The financial sector has been considerably reformed. Banks have 
become specialized and diversified. 
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During the first period, the PBOC continued to control the majority of commercial 
activities. The most significant progress in the banking system during the economic 
reform was the abolishment of the monobank in China. During 1979-1984, the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the People’s Capitalize 
Bank of China (PCBC) and the China International Thrust and Investment Corporation 
(CITIC) were established. Different banks had different functions: The ABC was 
responsible was responsible for the agriculture and rural economy. It guided and 
controlled Rural Credit Cooperatives. The BOC provided services to foreign exchange 
related banking business. The PCBC specialized in monitoring state budget, financed 
investment, and was also engaged in general banking business. The CITIC’s task was to 
attract foreign capital and advanced technologies to China. In 1979, the government 
decided that bank loans should gradually replace budgetary grants as the main financing 
sources of investment. All of the investment funds for enterprises’ were no longer granted 
by the state budget. 
In addition, just like in the real sector, China’s state specialized banks adopted a 
system of profit retention in 1983(Zhou Zhengqing, Research on the Monetary Policy in 
China, 1993). After paying business tax, banks could keep a specific proportion of the 
profits to develop business and to fund employee welfare. Because of this policy, state 
specialized banks became profit-driven. 
The Creation of a Two-Tier Banking System: 1984-1994 
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was established in 1984 to 
assume the remaining commercial lending activities of the PBOC. The PBOC became the 
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central bank of China in 1984. A two-tier banking system in China took shape. The 
Banking system became more diverse. Four nation-wide commercial banks (ABC, ICBC, 
BOC, and CBC) were permitted to compete with state-owned specialized banks in all 
banking business. In order to meet local funding needs, some regional development banks 
were established during this period. The non-bank financial institutions also expanded. 
Urban credit cooperatives expanded to serve small individually or collectively owned 
enterprises in urban areas. Trust and investment companies also developed very quickly. 
Most of these trust and investment companies were founded by local governments and 
the four state banks. In 1998, many trust and investment companies merged with state 
banks. Other non-bank financial institutions, such as leasing companies, security 
companies and insurance companies also emerged during this period. 
The Transition toward a Market-Oriented Financial System 
A strategy arose from the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Central Committee 
in 1993: establishing a structure conducive to the operation of a socialist market economy. 
This policy clearly pointed out the direction of future economic development: 
transformation of the BPOC into a modern central bank responsible for monetary policy 
and supervision of the financial system, separation of policy lending from commercial 
lending, gradual transformation of specialized banks into commercial banks and 
modernization of the infrastructure of the financial sector (Yanfen Huang, The Money 
Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, P13).   
Memorandum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 14 November 
1993 
As the central bank, the People’s Bank of China shall conduct monetary policy 
independently. 
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The Central bank of China shall be under the leadership of the State Council. 
The people’s  Bank of China shall manage the money supply and stabilize the 
currency value, by changing from relying mainly on control over the credit quota 
to the reserve ratio control. 
The People’s Bank of China shall supervise all other financial institutions. 
The People’s Bank of China will not conduct business with non-financial 
institutions. 
The banking business and the securities business shall be separated. 
A committee shall be formed to conduct monetary policy. 
The commercial banks shall engage in the management of assets, liabilities and 
risks. 
According to the situation of monetary supply and demand, the central bank shall 
make timely adjustments to the benchmark rates. 
The interest rates of the deposits and loans in the commercial banks can be freely 
floated within a certain range given by the PBOC. 
The memorandum pointed out that the PBOC obtained official permission from the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to become independent in conducting 
monetary policy. As we can see, the financial supervision function of the PBOC was 
emphasized in the memorandum. The legal right of the PBOC to formulate and 
implement monetary policy has also been emphasized in the Central Bank Law (the 
PBOC law) which was approved in 1995. The PBOC law mentioned that in order to 
stabilize the value of the currency and promote the growth of the economy, the PBOC 
should gradually use more indirect methods to control the money supply such as market 
based operations, discount rate adjustment, reserve ratio and providing loans to banks 
(Article 22). The application of the mandatory credit plan shall be gradually reduced or 
abolished. The PBOC law also mentioned that the government shall sell bonds to finance 
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its deficit instead of pushing the central bank to issue currency. Under the instruction of 
the PBOC law, the following financial reforms were carried out (Yanfen Huang, The 
Money Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China):  
1. From 1994 on, the PBOC was no longer responsible for financing budget 
deficits.  
2. In order to reduce the intervention of local government during monetary policy 
implementation in 1998,the PBOC reconstructed its organization. Local branches 
were replaced by nine interregional main branches which operate across 
provincial lines. 
3. As of January 1, 1998 the credit-quotas of the state banks were abolished. 
Then the Commercial Bank Law (the CB Law) was enacted on May 1st, 1995. The 
CB Law tried to guide the large domestic banks through a transform into independent 
commercial entities. According to the CB law, commercial banks shall operate 
independently and take responsibility for their own profits and losses. Government also 
implemented some policies to cooperate with the CB law. Three policy banks—The 
Import and Export Bank of China, the State Development Bank of China and The 
Agricultural Development Bank were founded to help state banks reduce policy-based 
lending. The Government also shut down some financial institutions that had incurred 
losses. State banks started to issue special treasury bonds to raise the capital adequacy 
ratio in order to write-off bad debts. Government also developed a competitive banking 
system: Co-operative banks started to expand after1995. In the meantime, the first private 
banking institution-Minsheng Bank was established in 1995. 
The Structure of Chinese Banking System 
During the 30 year development after economic reform, the diversity of the financial 
sector has been improved.  
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Type Ownership 
Business Scope or Operational 
Independence Law 
The 
central 
bank: the 
PPBC 
State-owned
• Formulating and implementing 
monetary policies 
• Exercising supervision and 
administration of the financial sector 
• Non-independence , under the 
leadership of the State Council 
The PBC 
law 
State-
owned 
commerci
al banks 
State-owned
• Performing deposit money bank 
business 
• Subject to the intervention of 
government 
The CB 
law 
Policy 
banks 
State-owned
• Provision of policy loans 
• Their financing is secured by capital 
and other contributions from the 
government, financial bond 
placements with state commercial 
banks and borrowing from the 
international  financial markets 
• Subject to the intervention of 
government 
none 
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Other 
commerci
al banks 
Indirectly 
state-owned 
except 
Minsheng 
Bank. 
Normally 
they are 
joint-stock 
banks, but 
their main 
shareholder
s are 
government 
agencies or 
SOEs 
• Performing deposit money bank 
business 
• Less subject to the intervention of 
government than state-owned 
commercial banks 
The CB 
law 
Non-bank 
financial 
institution
s:  
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Trust and 
Investmen
t 
Companie
s 
Initially 
owned by 
the local 
government 
and the 
state-owned 
commercial 
banks. Now 
they have 
various 
types of 
ownership. 
• Engaging in a wide scope of business 
• Subject to the intervention of local 
governments 
none 
Rural and 
urban 
credit 
cooperativ
es 
including 
urban 
cooperativ
e banks 
Collectively
-owned 
• Performing deposit money bank 
business and extending loans normally 
to collective enterprises 
• Subject to the intervention of the 
municipal and county governments 
The CB 
law 
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Financial 
companies
Various, 
normally 
owned by 
SOEs 
Engaging in intra-industry financing 
and other financial activities, like 
leasing, acceptances, bill discounting 
and credit guarantees 
none 
Financial 
leasing 
companies
Various, 
normally 
owned by 
SOEs 
Engaging in financing the imports of 
capital goods and equipment for 
export-oriented enterprises 
none 
Table 8 The Institutions of China’s Banking Sector 
According to Table 8, there are 9 types of financial institutions in China’s banking 
system. Compare to the pre-reform period, the diversity of the banking system had 
improved significantly. But banking system legislation is still not complete.
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Figure 7 The Structure of the China’s Financial Sector 
The Problems of China’s Banking System 
Lack of Independence of the PBOC and Poor Banking Supervision 
The condition of the central bank’s independence is a very important criterion of 
monetary policy efficiency. The independence of the central bank can firstly avoid 
political pressures to some extent. Pursuing political achievements, such as economic 
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growth and a low employment rate is one of the most important tasks for politicians 
during their terms. In order to highlight political achievements, governors like to see fast 
economic growth, which had already been a main target after China’s economic reform. 
If a central bank is under strict control by the government, like McDonough mentioned, it 
is inevitable “to be tempted to promote easy credit policies”( McDonough: The 
Importance of Central Bank Independence in Achieving Price Stability). Central banks 
have to issue more money and implement policies to help government expend total social 
needs in order to stimulate economic growth and lower the unemployment rate. Growth 
like this is short-term and will induce inflation. Lack of independence then weakens the 
efficiency of monetary policy. Even worse, the central bank probably needs to finance 
government budget deficits directly which has happened in China. The policies that the 
central bank implemented might relieve problems such as difficulties in financing 
government budget deficits or reducing unemployment in the short-term but may 
ultimately result in severe problems like high inflation and the need for severe credit-
tightening later on. Also, according to Grilli (Grilli et al.1991), there were two aspects to 
judge a central bank’s independence: economic independence and political independence. 
Economic independence can guarantee the right of the central bank to choose the suitable 
instrument to pursue the final goal of monetary policy. Grilli (Grilli et al.1991) pointed 
out that economic independence was mainly determined by: (1) whether the government 
can determine how much to borrow from the central bank. (2) whether the central bank 
controls monetary policy instruments (Grilli et al., 1991, p366-368). Political 
independence refers to the capacity of the central bank to choose the final goal of 
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monetary policy. As Grilli mentioned, political independence is determined by: (1) 
whether the governing authority of the central bank is under the control of the 
government. (2) whether government approval is needed before monetary policy 
implementation. (3)   whether price stability is explicitly stated in the central bank law. 
As we can see in Figure 7, the PBOC was led by the State Council as a government 
administrative organization before 1995 (Bank Regulations-1986). Apparently, the PBOC 
was not politically independent: The governor of the PBOC was appointed by the 
government; monetary policy decisions needed to be approved by the central government 
before implementation; The Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank 
of China stated that there were two equally weighted objectives for the PBOC’s monetary 
policy: development of the economy and currency stability. The PBOC didn’t have much 
economic independence either. First, the PBOC was required to finance the government 
budget deficits. As a government organization, the PBOC branches covered all provinces, 
cities and counties. Local government intervened in the operation of local PBOC 
branches to ensure that they were cooperating with economic development plans. Local 
branches were governed by both the PBOC’s headquarters and local government.  This 
system made the PBOC vulnerable to government interference. 
The PBOC gained some independence after 1995.The enactment of the PBOC law 
in 1995 stated that the PBOC was forbidden from providing credit to the government; the 
intervention by local government was phased out. Price stability became the primary 
objective of monetary policy. But unfortunately, it was still very difficult for the PBOC to 
maintain independence under the PBOC Law. The PBOC was still led by the State 
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Council. The governor was still appointed by the State Council. Although price stability 
has become the main target of monetary policy, the PBOC could not refuse requests by 
government, such as rescuing state-owned enterprises and maintaining political and 
social stability. Moreover, the objective of monetary policy was still subordinated to the 
government’s economic development target. Monetary policy decision still had to be 
approved by the State Council as before.  
The banking supervision system is still underdeveloped in China. Although banking 
supervision has been improved since 1978, it is still insufficient. First, as mentioned 
earlier, the PBOC still lacks independence; its supervision is subject to the intervention of 
government agencies. Also, the banking law system is still incomplete. As we can see in 
Table 8, there are no specific laws that govern policy banks, trust and investment 
companies, financial companies and financial leasing companies. 
Obligations to the SOEs 
During the reform period, the allocation of investment funds shifted gradually from 
non-repayable budgetary grants to interest-bearing bank loans (2.2.1). Because of this 
reform, the banking institutions were obligated to support the SOEs. This brought about 
serious moral hazard in the banking system. The bank was obliged to provide loans to the 
SOEs regardless of their capacities of repayment. Banks neither had the ability nor 
incentive to select borrowers. Moreover, compared to developed countries, the 
accounting and auditing system in China was still not well established. Banks would like 
to monitor their borrowers, but they could not get enough information. SOEs also had the 
privilege to low-cost credit because most banks wanted to loan to them. As I mentioned 
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earlier, SOEs had little concern for interest rate and investment risk because of the “soft 
budget” constraint. Although state-owned enterprises were also vested with a financial 
interest in maximizing profit, those that incurred losses could not be subject to 
bankruptcy. No matter how much they lost, they were always bailed out with financial 
subsidies or other instruments. SOE could still survive even after chronic losses. This 
“soft budget constraint” mechanism was the main factor that led to the low efficiency. 
Consequently, financial losses increased year by year due to the SOEs’ inability to repay. 
In order to rescue these SOEs, banks were required to provide the same businesses new 
loans. The situation deteriorated. Large non-performing loans worsened the profitability 
of state banks. 
The government was caught in a dilemma. As Yanfen Huang pointed out in the The 
Monetary Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, refusing loans to loss-making 
enterprises would cause widespread bankruptcies and unemployment, which would cause 
political and social problems. However, continuing to provide loans to them would wreck 
financial reform (Yanfen Huang, the Money Supply Process and Monetary Policy in 
China). Bankruptcies of these SOEs would surely increase the unemployment rate. In the 
meantime, some enterprises might also be hurt due to the decrease of aggregate demand. 
This can happen very fast. However, from a long-term point of view, even though bailing 
out these inefficient poor-performing SOEs may prevent widespread bankruptcies and 
unemployment, it can damage long-term economic performance. This also affects the 
ability of monetary policy to make a better trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 
If monetary policy only considers the one problem instead of making a trade-off between 
 51 
the two, easily cause the other under such conditions. Once this situation happens, it 
affects the fluctuation of the economy, making cyclical ups and downs more volatile. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MONETARY POLICY 
Until 2008, China’s economy had experienced five business cycles. The 
fluctuation of these business cycles was highly related to China’s economic policy. 
During the 30 years period after economic reform, China’s monetary policy gradually 
transformed from a direct credit control pattern to indirect control. The instruments of 
monetary policy were also improved. 
Credit Plan 
Brief Introduction of Credit Plan Evolution 
Although the credit plan was gradually phased out, it played an important role in 
China’s monetary policy history. The credit plan had a significant effect on the first two 
business cycles after economic reform.  Before economic reform, monetary policy was 
implemented through the credit plan and the cash plan.  The credit plan specified the 
amount of credit needed by enterprises. At that time, monetary policy was only a passive 
instrument to help the government achieve its objective. After economic reform, the 
credit plan was still the main policy instrument. Instead of simply specifying the amount 
of credit needed to support government’s goal (before economic reform), the credit plan 
began to take the inflation and real GDP growth into account. The most important change 
happened in 1985. Owing to the establishment of the central banking system, the credit 
plan gradually transformed from a direct policy instrument to an indirect policy 
instrument. After 1985, the PBOC was responsible for the overall credit quota of 
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financial institutions. This overall credit plan was a goal of the country’s credit operation 
and was passed to the headquarters of the state banks from the PBOC. According to the 
overall credit plan, the PBOC would give the state banks specific credit quotas. State 
banks could continue providing loans until the new loans reached the quotas. After 
implementation of the PBOC law in 1995, government planned to abolish the credit plan 
system. Then the credit plan was replaced by the guidance plan in 1998. Unlike the credit 
plan, the guidance plan was only a reference for the loan-decisions of the state banks. The 
PBOC could persuade the state banks to follow the guidance plan on lending but could 
not force them to implement it. After this reform, the credit plan was transferred to the 
“moral persuasion” or “window guidance” and was no longer the main instrument of 
monetary policy. 
As a direct control instrument of monetary policy, the credit plan was not an 
efficient monetary policy choice. China executed the credit plan for a considerable 
amount of time because of the economy’s unique state. First, China was short of capital 
needed to pursue high economic growth after economic reform. Through the credit plan, 
the PBOC could easily govern the money supply process and guide the capital flow to 
high priority sectors through the banking system. In the meantime, because of the 
decentralization process, investment funds which came from budgetary grants declined 
due to the deterioration of the central government’s budget. The credit plan then became 
an instrument to channel subsidies to the SOEs in order to make up the decline of 
investment funds. 
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The implementation of the credit plan included two steps. The first step was a top-
to-bottom process. Taking into account the planned growth in output and investment, the 
expected price level and the velocity of money, the PBOC figured out an overall credit 
plan draft which included the size and amount of new loans and the share of total credit 
that would be distributed among the state banks. Then, the PBOC transmitted the credit 
plan draft to the headquarters of state banks. The headquarters of state banks then passed 
the draft quota and deposit targets to their provincial and regional branches. Then the 
bottom-up process began. The local branches of the state banks would develop their own 
deposit target and credit plan dependent on the local funds and development needs and 
would then pass these on to local branches of the PBOC. Provincial branches of the 
PBOC would summarize the deposit and credit plan of local state bank branches and 
develop provincial plans. Provincial plans would be submitted to the headquarters of the 
PBOC. Based on these provincial plans, the PBOC would revise the initial credit plan and 
submit the final draft to the State Council for final approval. After the final credit plan 
was decided, the PBOC set final quotas for the headquarters of state banks, which then 
set quotas for their local branches. As mentioned, state banks could continue to provide 
loans until the new loans reached the quotas. When the local branches of the state banks 
did not run out their quotas but did not have enough deposits (funds) to make loans, they 
could borrow from the PBOC. This was a motivation for banks to attain higher quotas. 
Year 
Planned target 
(a)(billion Yuan)
Actual 
volume(b)(billion 
Yuan) 
(b)/(a) 
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1990 170 275.7 1.622 
1991 210 287.8 1.37 
1992 283 352.6 1.246 
1993 380 482.6 1.275 
1994 470 607.5 1.293 
1995 570 691.5 1.213 
1996 650 793.8 1.221 
Table 9 The Efficiency of the Credit Plan 
(Source: HangshengXie (1997), P.5) 
As we can see in Table 9, there were huge discrepancies between planned targets 
and actual volume. According to the data, the credit plan was poorly implemented. Many 
economists argued the credit plan was, in fact, ineffective. Local branches of the central 
bank needed to cooperate with local authorities. The ambition of local government 
induced significant investment demand. Meanwhile, the soft constraint was also 
responsible for this huge gap. The World Bank (1995, p.52-54) proved that during the 
upswing, the credit plan ceased to be binding on domestic credit and loan expansion. 
Contrary to what we expected, the central bank’s money supply decision seemed not to 
have stabilized the economy. The fact was, the credit plans induced economic fluctuation. 
In the boom time, the credit plan failed to control the expansion of domestic credit. As 
Jun Ma mentioned, “During all periods of economic overheating, the credit and cash 
issuance plans were not strictly adhered to and were repeatedly revised upwards by 
substantial margins” (Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Management in China, 
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p101). A high inflation rate and policy instability emerged because of the ineffectiveness 
of the credit plan. Then central authority launched an austerity policy immediately to 
sharply reduce credit when the inflation rate was too high. Because of the policy, credit 
was reduced tremendously and artificially. The economy suddenly entered a recession. 
Once the economy had been cooled down, the central authority then loosened its control 
and the credit growth rate would bounce back. This type of “stop-and-go” cycle 
characterized the PBOC’s monetary policy during the early stage of economic reform. It 
was also the main factor that caused the high volatility of the first two business cycles 
after economic reform. 
The credit plan performed very well before economic reform. As the market-
oriented economic reform proceeded, the banking system changed dramatically. The 
credit plan was finally phased out because of its ineffectiveness and mismatch to the 
reformed economic system. The efficiency of the credit plan was weakened by several 
reasons: 
First, the most significant change after economic reform in the financial system was 
decentralization. As I mentioned previously, local branches of the PBOC were under 
control of the “dual leadership”. Local branches of the PBOC were led by both the head 
office of the PBOC and local government. Meanwhile, local branches of the PBOC 
enjoyed discretionary authority over a part of the PBOC’s annual lending to the banking 
institutions (The Money Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China,Yanfen Huang, 
p86). Because of decentralization, the PBOC was not able to draw up a precise credit 
plan on the basis of the credit needs. As mentioned before, the implementation of the 
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credit plan included “top-to-bottom” and”bottom-to-top” procedures. Local government 
strived for a larger share of bank credit because of the decentralization. Local branches of 
the PBOC would want to cooperate with local government authority because of the dual 
leadership. The result was, as the World Bank explained, much more a bottom-up 
exercise than a top-down one (World Bank, 1995, p43). Working with the local bank 
branches, local government found many ways to exaggerate their credit needs during the 
bottom-up procedure in order to get a high credit quota. The credit quota was set lower 
than the credit needs due to the PBOC’s awareness of this behavior. The credit gap 
always existed between the credit plan and practical credit demands. The gap referred to 
the amount of bank loans which was considered to be necessary but not included in the 
credit plan. Thus, credit quotas would inevitably be exceeded. During the implementation 
of the credit plan, the PBOC was always forced to adjust the credit quota upward because 
of the huge pressure of credit demand. This eroded the credibility of the credit plan and 
made the credit plan impracticable. The credit plan was likely more of a monetary game 
between local state bank branches which represented the interests of the local authority 
and the PBOC. There was also a discrepancy in objectives between the local state 
branches and the PBOC. Given a specific credit quota, the local state bank branches 
would prefer high yield investment projects. On the contrary, the PBOC favored essential 
projects such as those in the agriculture and infrastructure sectors which local state banks. 
The PBOC had the flexibility to revise the credit quotas ex post. Thus, when the PBOC 
observed the under-investment in essential projects by the local state branches, it had to 
provide additional credit to the essential projects to finance their need. This also drew up 
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the credit quotas. Furthermore, the local branch of the PBOC had the authority to provide 
loans to banking institutions. Local branches were under pressure from local governments 
to make up the credit quota which was beyond the planned quotas.  
Another cause of the inefficiency of the credit plan was the diversification of the 
banking system after economic reform. Many nationwide and regional commercial banks 
and non-banks financial institutions grew rapidly. The increasing diversity of the banking 
system caused the decline of the four state-owned banks’ share of the financial system. 
This means that even if the PBOC were able to implement the plan, it was difficult for the 
PBOC to monitor and control how the banking institutions used these funds, and thus the 
total money supply. Also, poor banking supervision system gave banking institutions 
channels to circumvent the credit plan. For example, banking institutions transferred 
funds to non-banking financial institutions because these institutions were outside of the 
jurisdiction of the credit plan and were subject to less strict regulation. 
One target of the initial design of the credit plan was redistribution of funds. Usually, 
deposits would exceed the credit quota in high-income regions. On the contrary, deposits 
could not finance the credit quota in most low-income regions. The PBOC expected that 
the high-income regions would transfer surplus funds to the PBOC in the form of excess 
reserves. Then the PBOC could transfer these excess reserves to low-income regions. 
However in practice, regions with surplus funds were not willing to transfer anything to 
the PBOC. Regions with surplus funds would bargain for higher credit quotas more 
actively because of their high deposits while banks in low-income regions usually had 
difficulties in absorbing enough deposits to finance the assigned quotas. Hence the PBOC 
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finally had to provide additional funds to finance this gap between deposits and the credit 
quota.  
 
Interest Rate Policy 
Brief Review of Interest Rate Policy History 
Interest rate policy before 1978 
The interest rate is an important policy instrument of the Chinese government. 
Before 1978, the interest rate was controlled completely by the central government 
because of the highly centralized financial system. During the early stage after the 
establishment of People’s Republic of China the economy was in a severe situation 
because of the instability of the communist regime. The PBOC encountered many 
problems; namely, financing the war expenses and rescuing the poor economy. In order 
to control high inflation and help the ailing economy, China implemented a high interest 
rate policy. According to the data, the interest rate on six-month fixed deposits reached 
150% and the interest on saving deposits also soared to 30%-60% in May 1949. The 
lending rate to private business reached 90%-210%. The interest rate was higher than the 
inflation rate during this period. The policy intended to raise interest rate helped the 
PBOC absorb significant funds and prevented hoarding and speculation. The price level 
was comparatively stable in the early 1950s. The PBOC adjusted the interest rate level 
based on the inflation rate and the profit rate of different industries. Until June 1952, the 
one-month fixed deposit rate dropped to 7.5% and the one-year fixed deposit rate was 
only 12%. There were two policy principles during the period: first, different policies 
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were implemented by the PBOC between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises; 
second, interest rate policy needed to connect to the market.  Low interest rate policy was 
executed since 1953 in order to stimulate investment and finance economic construction. 
The lending rate of state-owned industry per month was only 0.45% and the lending rate 
of state-owned business per month dropped to 0.69%. The interest rate of other industries 
(both state-owned and private) also decreased dramatically. In 1955, interest rates began 
to fall.  
During the period 1958 - 1976, interest rate policy was ignored because of its 
potential to mislead political power. From 1958 to 1978, the interest rate was frozen and 
far below equilibrium levels because interest rates were regarded as a symbol of 
exploitation by capitalists according to Karl Marx’s theory of surplus value (Yi, Gang, 
Money, Banking and Financial Markets in China, 1994, p.78). In the meantime, the 
interest rate structure had been oversimplified. Under political pressure, various types of 
interest rate had been eliminated. There were only four rates for bank deposits and seven 
bank lending rates in 1978 (Zhou, Zhengqing, research on the monetary policy in 
China,1993.p.224). Government artificially set all different lending rates at 6%. The 
interest rate structure, which was well established during the period 1949 – 1958, was 
abandoned entirely after 1958. 
Interest Rate Policy between 1978-1985 
After 1978, authorities realized the important role that interest rate can play in 
economic development. During this period interest rate policy was considered to be an 
effective instrument of monetary policy once again. The government began to reset the 
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overly low interest rate to a reasonable level in order to absorb funds. From 1979 to 1985, 
the PBOC adjusted the deposit interest rate five times: China’s economy began to recover 
after the cultural Revolution. In order to develop and stabilize the economy, the PBOC 
increased the deposit rate in 1979.4, 1980.4, and 1982.4 to finance the economic 
construction demand. The main purpose of the last two interest rate increases in 1985 
(1985.4 and 1985.8) was to protect depositors against severe price level increases. 
Meanwhile, interest rates were diversified. Banks began to provide three-year, five-year 
and eight-year deposit rates. The PBOC had the authority to adjust interest rates but any 
major adjustment had to be reported to the State Council. Changing interest rates by any 
local branches of state banks or local branches of the PBOC was forbidden. This kind of 
highly centralized interest rate policy was too strict and sometimes impractical. In order 
to get a more effective interest rate system, the State Council authorized the PBOC a 20% 
floating range of interest rate adjustment ( The Interest Rate Policy in the Economic 
Development, Wenping, Wang, p.154). This was an important point of progress in 
China’s monetary policy history. After being granted the 20% margin on interest rate 
adjustment, the PBOC then permitted banks some interest rate adjustment quota. This 
decentralization policy gave local banks rights to adjust the interest rate within a specific 
range based on the different local economic situation.  
Interest Rate after 1986 
Interest rate policy after 1986 had a distinct feature: the interest rate was highly 
compatible with economic fluctuation. Interest rates started to increase in 1985 in order to 
fight against the high price level. The economy kept growing quickly after 1985 and 
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inflation was out of control. The PBOC then increased the one-year deposit rate from 
0.6% to 0.72% (per month) in September 1988. But the overheated economy was not 
cooled down. Public panic pushed the PBOC to increase the interest rate again in 
February 1989. The one-year deposit interest rate (per month) reached 0.945 %.  
The overheated economy began to cool down in the second half of 1989. 
Unfortunately, the economy suddenly suffered from severe depression. Government then 
released tight economic policy. Deposit rates started to drop after April 1990. The interest 
rate decreased three times during this period: on 1990.4.15, 1990.8.21 and 1991.4.21. The 
one-year deposit interest rate dropped to 0.63 %( per month) to stimulate economic 
recovery. 
Aside from inflation, the economy has grown in a stable manner since 1992. The 
PBOC again increased interest rates in May and July, 1993. The one-year deposit interest 
rate reached its peak at 0.915% (per month). China’s interest rate stayed at a very high 
level from 1993 to 1996. Although the PBOC implemented high interest rate policy, the 
inflation rate was still very high. The PBOC had to execute the subsidy rate for value-
preserved savings to protect depositors. The subsidy rate was only 0.19% in 1994.3, and 
then increased to 1.324% in 1995.12. Inflation returned to a normal level, according to 
interest rate policy targets. The speed of economic development slowed down after 1996. 
Fixed investment decreased. The PBOC adjusted interest rates eight times during the 
period 1996 - 2002 to stimulate economic growth. High frequency of interest rate 
decrease did not meliorate the economy. Consumption demand was still insufficient and 
saving kept increasing even when the interest rate was very low. After June, 2004, the 
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domestic price level increased more than 5% in the five months following. The PBOC 
decided to increase the interest rate in order to control inflation. This was the first interest 
rate increase in nine years. 
Major Changes to Interest Rate Policy after 1978 
As previously discussed, during 1958 to 1976 the interest rate policy was abandoned 
entirely. Since the beginning of the economic reform in 1978, the interest rate has been 
recognized as an important monetary policy instrument. Although interest rates are still 
heavily administered, its role has become increasingly important. There have been major 
changes to interest rate policy: 
Interest rates have been adjusted more frequently after 1979. In order to take account for 
changing economic circumstances, the PBOC frequently adjusts the interest rate. As we 
can see in Table 10, the PBOC adjusted the banking institutions’ deposit rates 20 times in 
the period1979 - 1998. In the 3-year period from 1995-1998, there were eight interest rate 
adjustments.  
Time and Date 
of Interest Rate 
Change 
One-Year 
Nominal 
Deposit 
Rate 
(%) 
One-Year 
Nominal 
Working 
Capital 
Lending Rate 
(%) 
Inflation 
Rate 
(%) 
One-Year 
Real 
Deposit 
Rate 
(%) 
One-Year 
Real 
Working 
Capital 
Lending 
Rate 
(%) 
1978 3.24 5.04 0.7 2.54 4.34
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4/1/1979 3.96 5.04 2 1.96 3.04
4/1/1980 5.4 5.04 6 -0.6 -0.96
1981 5.4 5.04 2.4 3 2.64
4/1/1982 5.76 7.2 1.9 3.86 5.3
1983 5.76 7.2 1.5 4.26 5.7
1984 5.76 7.2 2.8 2.96 4.4
4/1/1985 6.84 7.92 8.8 -1.96 -0.88
8/1/1985 7.2 7.92 8.8 -1.6 -0.88
1986 7.2 7.92 6 1.2 1.92
1987 7.2 7.92 7.3 -0.1 0.62
9/1/1988 8.64 9 18.5 -9.86 -9.5
2/1/1989 11.34 11.34 17.8 -6.46 -6.46
4/15/1990 10.08 10.08 2.1 7.98 7.98
8/21/1990 8.64 9.36 2.1 6.54 7.26
4/21/1991 7.56 8.64 2.9 4.66 5.74
1992 7.56 8.64 5.4 2.16 3.24
5/15/1993 9.18 9.36 13.2 -4.02 -3.84
7/11/1993 10.98 10.98 13.2 -2.22 -2.22
1994 10.98 10.98 21.7 -10.72 -10.72
1/1/1995 10.98 10.98 14.8 -3.82 -3.82
7/1/1995 10.98 12.06 14.8 -3.82 -2.74
5/1/1996 9.18 10.98 6.1 3.08 4.88
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8/23/1996 7.47 10.08 6.1 1.37 3.98
10/23/1997 5.67 8.64 0.8 4.87 7.84
3/25/1998 5.22 7.92 -2.6 7.82 10.52
7/1/1998 4.77 6.93 -2.6 7.37 9.53
12/7/1998 3.78 6.39 -2.6 6.38 8.99
Table 10 Interest Rate Adjustment from 1979 to 1998 
Banking institutions have been allowed some flexibility in adjusting their own 
lending rates. As mentioned earlier, state-owned banks and other commercial banks have 
been allowed to adjust working capital lending rates within a margin which was set by 
the PBOC above the administered rate. At the beginning of economic development in 
China, the major problem was a lack of funds. Government introduced the interest rate 
mechanism in order to absorb large idle funds by paying a high interest rate. One part of 
funds was directly assigned by government to specific industrial departments or districted 
according to government’s economic development strategy. Another part of funds was 
offered by banks to companies in different industries, using the interest rate mechanism. 
Different industries would have different interest rate policies to cooperate with the 
government’s economic development strategy. The right to change interest rates was 
strictly controlled by the government. Authorizing margins to banks was also a measure 
taken to achieve the economic development strategy. Instead of letting banks set their 
own interest rate, the main purpose for authorizing margins to banks was to balance the 
distribution of funds which still carried the artificial characteristics of the planned 
economy. With the rapid economic development, severe imbalances emerged in different 
districts, especially between the rural area and the urban area. As mentioned earlier, profit 
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seeking banks transferred large amounts of funds from rural areas to urban areas and then 
to the eastern coastal areas where the economy was well developed. This imbalanced 
distribution of funds contradicted the original purpose of the government’s economic 
plan. First, government expected a higher speed of urbanization and modernization in the 
rural area. Unfortunately, large parts of funds which were intended to speed up 
urbanization were instead absorbed by cities because of the high profit possibilities. 
Second, funds from rural area were also largely absorbed by industry which caused a lack 
of funds for agriculture. In order to better this situation, government set the different 
margin directly. From 1987 to 1995, this  margin was 20% (that is , if the administered 
rate is 10%, the upper ceiling of the working capital lending rate for banking institutions 
is 12%) (The Process of China’s Interest Rate Liberalisation,1999,Jing, Xuecheng and 
BingxiShen). The margin set dropped to 10% during the period 1995 - 1998. Compare to 
state-owned banks and commercial banks, non-banking financial institutions had more 
flexibility in setting their interest rate. According to the data, the margin set for rural 
credit cooperatives was 60%, urban credit cooperatives was 30% and trust and 
investment companies was 20% (Mehran, H.,M. Quintyn, T.Nordman and B. 
Laurens,1996, Monetary and Exchange System Reform in China: an Experiment in 
Gradualism, IMF). We can see that the margin for financial companies in rural area was 
much higher than that of banks in urban areas. As the government expected, high interest 
rates did attract large funds back to rural areas. But this bold policy also induced serious 
problems: the high interest rate offered by rural financial organizations (rural credit 
cooperatives, urban credit cooperatives, etc.) impacted the amount of savings of other 
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urban financial organizations which was the main resource of industrial development in 
urban areas. Urban industry was badly hit by the abnormal funds transfer. Second, high 
interest rates became a huge burden for rural financial companies. Operating cost 
increased and accumulation of funds decreased. Meanwhile, a lot of rural financial 
organizations could not afford this high interest rate because they did not have channels 
to make good use of these funds. Finally, rural financial organizations had to offer these 
funds to companies in the city (not in the rural areas) to get comparatively high profit as 
the last resort in order to pay the high interest rate. 
Interest rates have been diversified. The PBOC set administrative ceilings on the 
interbank rate before 1996 in the interbank market. According to the operation of the 
unified interbank money market, the administrative ceilings on interbank rates were 
phased out. In addition, the PBOC started to conduct its market-based operations through 
repurchasing short-term securities. The rate of the security repurchase was determined 
through a bidding process involving market participants (Yanfen Huang, The Money 
Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, p.108). In the bond market, the interest 
rates of government bonds were administratively determined before 1995. The first dealer 
auction of short-term government bonds was introduced in 1995. Then government 
started to issue bonds in 1996 using a competitive bidding system (except in 1997 and 
1998). In the meantime, the PBOC also determined the ceiling for enterprise bonds’ 
interest rate. The ceiling was 140% of the bank deposit rates with the same maturity 
according to the “Provisional Regulation on Enterprise Bonds”. After 1991, this ceiling 
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was lowered down to 120% of the bank deposit rate with the same maturity (Yanfen 
Huang, The Money Supply Process and Monetary Policy in China, p.108). 
Some Issues with the Current Interest Rate System 
One of the interest rate setting principles in China is that the PBOC needs to take the 
profitability of firms and the state banks into account. According to Karl Marx’s theory, 
average profit can be divided into two parts: interest profit and enterprise profit. Thus, on 
the one hand, the lending rate should be lower than the average profit rate. On the other 
hand, the lending rates still need to guarantee the profitability of state-owned enterprises 
and state banks. In practice, the “average profit rate” is very abstract.  It is almost 
impossible for the PBOC to know the level of the average profit rate accurately. The 
PBOC then sets the lending rates based on the banks’ average cost of funds plus an 
intermediation margin considered to be adequate (Yanfen Huang, The Money Supply 
Process and Monetary Policy in China, p.110). This interest rate setting process is very 
subjective. Also, interest rates are used as a tool for industrial and regional policy. Instead 
of setting a market-oriented interest rate, interest rates may be set at levels that reflect 
political objectives. Thus, interest rates may be incompatible with market conditions. 
Also, the interest rate decision-making process is complex and time consuming (Ping Xie, 
“Toward a Market-Oriented Interest Rate Policy in the Transformation of China’s 
Economy”, in: Interest Rate Liberalization and Money Market Development, 145-154). It 
is very difficult for the PBOC to manage the large number of different interest rates. The 
PBOC cannot adjust the corresponding process between the PBOC and the relevant 
ministries in time, and all the decisions must be approved by the State Council. As we 
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can see in Table 10 and Figure 8, interest rate adjustment often lagged behind the changes 
in inflation rate. 
 
Figure 8 Interest Rate Adjustment from 1979 to 1998 
There is no transmission mechanism in the interest rate system. Usually, in a market 
economy system, the central bank can change its base rate, like the rediscount rate, to 
implement monetary policy. The changes of the interest rate may affect banks’ liquidity 
and then change the money market interest rates.  In response to the changes in the 
rediscount rates and interbank rates, banking institutions may change their own lending 
rate which affects investment decisions. Banking institutions will also change the deposit 
rates which will further affect the choice between consuming now and later. The greater 
and more rapid the response of lending and deposit rates to changes in rediscount rates 
and money market rates, the more rapid and effective the transmission of monetary policy 
measures to the real economy (Yanfen Huang, The Money Supply Process and Monetary 
Policy in China, p.115). Instead of letting banking institutions determine their own 
interest rate, in China the PBOC determines both central bank rates and bank rates. The 
PBOC adjusts these interest rates almost at the same time. There is no transmission 
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mechanism from the central bank rates to the bank rates. Banking institutions have no 
autonomy in setting their own interest rates unless the PBOC adjusts bank lending rates. 
This results in a barrier between the money market rate and the bank rates. Although the 
PBOC may also adjust bank rates, such adjustment often has a lag and cannot reflect the 
behavior or response of banking institutions. Lack of interest rate setting autonomy by 
banks will have some negative implications. Although banks can have a floating margin 
to adjust the interest rate based on a benchmark loan and deposit rate which is often 
determined by the PBOC in some situations, cases which can meet the changing interest 
rate requirements are rare. Most of the time, banks use the benchmark loan and deposit 
rate during business. The central banks controls bank interest including interest type, 
level, floating margin, even the interest bearing manner. Too many things that needed to 
be taken of forced the PBOC to bite off more than it can chew (e.g., loan interest rates). 
The benchmark loan rate is mostly determined by maturity; risk is less considered. All 
working capital loans and fixed asset loans have the same interest rate, no matter the 
difference of industry and profit rate. This induces a situation in which high-profit 
enterprises are eager to borrow. On the other hand, the loan interest rate will become a 
serious burden for enterprises with low-profit margins. Different industries have different 
profit margins and payback periods. This kind of inelastic interest rate policy cannot 
optimize the utilization of funds. The original function of the interest rate is now less 
effective without the guidance of market force. Government could loosen the control of 
this strict interest rate and give banks more freedom to adjust the interest rate. The 
interest rate would come to be adjusted by the market, high-profit enterprises would be 
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able to find lower interest rates, and low profit enterprises would likely face higher rates. 
Through this market-orientated interest rate system, the economy could become more 
efficient. 
Exchange Rate Policy 
The Evolution of China’s Exchange Rate Policy 
Exchange Rate Policy Before 1979 
From 1949 to the late 1970s, China fixed the exchange rate at a highly overvalued 
level because of the import substitution industrialization strategy. Through this economic 
planning, the industrial development accelerated and the dependence on imported 
manufactured goods was reduced. During this period, China’s main exchange rate policy 
included: an overvalued exchange rate, direct controls on imports and exports and tight 
controls over foreign exchange. The overvalued exchange rate allowed the government to 
import machinery and equipment to some priority industries at a relatively lower cost but 
overvalued exchange rate also led to an excess demand for foreign currency. As early as 
，1950 Chinese authority introduced extensive exchange controls that, among other 
things, required the deposit of all sources of foreign exchange, including export earnings, 
in the Bank of China (Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy, “The Future of China’s 
Exchange Rate Policy”, p.3). The overvaluation of the currency depressed the domestic 
prices of some traditional export goods, inducing the drop of production of export goods. 
In order to solve this problem, government required producers to achieve a specific level 
of output. These products would be sold to state trading companies and then to the 
international market. 
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Exchange Rate Policy in the 1990s 
Since the mid-1990s, China’s exchange rate system began to move to a system in 
which the value of its currency was determined by supply and demand in the foreign 
exchange market. The Chinese government eased controls on trade and other current 
account transactions. The State Council approved a system which allowed exporters and 
their local government to retain a share of their foreign exchange earnings. In the 
meantime, local government was allowed to regain a part of the foreign exchange 
earnings from nontrade sources, such as overseas remittances and tourism. This policy 
stimulated the development of exports and other sources of foreign exchange. In the mid-
1980s, the government sanctioned foreign exchange markets (swap centers) in several 
cities. The initial target for sanctioning foreign exchange markets was controlling the 
price of foreign currency. But the volume of transactions expanded tremendously and the 
initial restrictions on participation in these markets gradually eroded. Foreign exchange 
transactions reached 13 billion dollars in 1990. On the open foreign exchange market, the 
price invariably displayed a premium to the official exchange rate. This situation clearly 
showed the overvaluation of the renmibi by the official exchange rate. 
Another policy instrument the government used to move the currency toward a 
market-determined rate was devaluation. The State Council introduced an “internal 
settlement rate” of RMB2.8 to the US dollar in January 1981 (Morris Goldstein and 
Nicholas R. Lardy, “The Future of China’s Exchange Rate Policy”, p.5). Compare to the 
official exchange rate – RMB1.5, the new rate was nearly 100 percent higher. This 
measure introduced a dual exchange rate system. The official exchange rate was applied 
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to nontrade transactions. In 1985, the internal settlement rate was abolished and all 
transactions were settled at the official exchange rate. The official exchange rate 
continued to devaluate over the next few years. The exchange rate dropped to RMB5.8 at 
year-end 1993. On January 1, 1994, the government unified official exchange rate 
decreased to RMB8.7. In the next 18 months, the government revalued the currency 
several times. In October 1997, the exchange rate was set to RMB8.28. Then through 
October 1997 to July 2005, the exchange rate fluctuated in a very narrow range around 
RMB8.28.Renminbi was undervalued for a long time. One main reason for this 
undervaluation is related to China’s export policy. Developing exports was a major target 
of the Chinese government in its plan to increase economic growth. In order to accelerate 
economic development, the Chinese government has implemented policies which 
encourage exports since the 1990s. During the 1990s a large part of economic 
development was stimulated by exports. In the 1980s, the average contribution of exports 
to economic growth was only 0.5%. The contribution increased to 7.5% during the 
1990s.In 1990s, the insufficient demand and the Asian financial crisis led the Chinese 
government to make an effort to expand exports in order to stimulate economic growth. 
A focus on exports shows high exchange rate dependence. Implementing the reminbi 
undervaluation policy would drive the exports. 
Development of Exchange Policy since mid-2005  
On July 21, 2005 China had a new currency regime. The government not only revalued 
the official bilateral rate by 2.1 percent, appreciated from RMB8.28 to RMB8.11 to the 
dollar but also announced that the exchange rate policy of renminbi would change from 
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being pegged to the dollar to being managed “with reference to a basket of currencies”. 
The PBOC also announced that the exchange rate would become more flexible and its 
value would be determined by “market supply and demand”. The nominal renmibi-dollar 
rate was RMB6.83 by the end of 2008. Compare to the exchange rate in July 2005, 
renminbi was appreciated by 21 percent. As we can see in Table 11, the exchange rate of 
renminbi relative to the dollar fluctuated in a small range during this period. Although 
Chinese government launched the “basket” exchange rate policy, empirical studies 
(Eichengreen 2004b; Frankel and Wei 2007, 2008) have found that the renminbi 
continued to track the US dollar instead of managing the renminbi with reference to a 
basket of currencies. 
Year Date Rate 
Appreciation (percent) 
Month          
(over previous 
month) 
Annualized 
(month*12) 
2005 June 30 8.277     
  July29 8.108 2.1 24.9 
  August 31 8.097 0.1 1.6 
  September 30 8.093 0.1 0.6 
  October 31 8.084 0.1 1.3 
  November 30 8.080 0.1 0.7 
  December 31 8.070 0.1 1.4 
2006 January 27 8.061 0.1 1.4 
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  February 28 8.042 0.2 2.9 
  March 31 8.017 0.3 3.7 
  April 28 8.017 0.0 0.1 
  May 31 8.019 0.0 -0.3 
  June 30 7.996 0.3 3.5 
  July 31 7.973 0.3 3.4 
  August 31 7.959 0.2 2.2 
  September 29 7.909 0.6 7.6 
  October 31 7.879 0.4 4.5 
  November 30 7.844 0.5 5.4 
  December 29 7.809 0.4 5.4 
2007 January 31 7.778 0.4 4.8 
  February 28 7.741 0.5 5.7 
  March 30 7.734 0.1 1.0 
  April 30 7.706 0.4 4.5 
  May 31 7.651 0.7 8.6 
  June 29 7.616 0.5 5.5 
  July 31 7.574 0.6 6.6 
  August 31 7.561 0.2 2.1 
  September 28 7.511 0.7 8.0 
  October 31 7.469 0.6 6.7 
  November 30 7.400 0.9 11.3 
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  December 31 7.305 1.3 15.6 
2008 January 31 7.185 1.7 19.9 
 
February 29 7.106 1.1 13.4 
 
March 31 7.019 1.2 14.8 
 
April 31 7.000 0.3 3.2 
 
May 30 6.947 0.8 9.2 
 
June 30 6.859 1.3 15.4 
 
July 31 6.839 0.3 3.6 
 
August 29 6.835 0.1 0.8 
 
September 26 6.818 0.2 2.9 
 
October 31 6.826 -0.1 -1.3 
 
November 28 6.835 -0.1 -1.6 
  December 31 6.835 0.0 0.1 
Table 11 The Exchange Rate of RMB from 2005 to 2008 
Through mid-2008, the Chinese government took two steps to reinforce appreciation 
of the renminbi. First, the value-added tax (VAT) rebates for producers of exported goods 
were canceled in September 2006.This policy increased the final cost of producing 
exports. In June 2007, Chinese authorities adjusted the rate of rebate of 37 percent of all 
export products, including eliminating rebates of 553 products and reducing the rebate 
rate of 2268 products. This measure would noticeably affect export production. In the 
meantime, the government introduced changes to the export processing regime that 
increased the costs of assembling exports from imported parts and components, thus 
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reducing the competitiveness of these goods on international markets (Morris Goldstein 
and Nicholas R. Lardy, “The Future of China’s Exchange Rate Policy”, p.20). The 
authorities added 1950 products to the restricted list for import processing. 
Due to the policy, China’s current account surplus expanded dramatically. The 
current account surplus reached $68.7 billion (3.6 percent of GDP) in 2004, and then rose 
to $160.8 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 2005, $250 billion (9.4 percent of GDP) in 2006 
and $372 billion (11 percent of GDP) in 2007. In 2008, China’s current account surplus 
was $426 billion, 9.8 percent of GDP. The official holdings of foreign exchange reserves 
are also accelerated. Government intervention in the market increased sharply. China’s 
currency became increasingly undervalued. The estimated degree of undervaluation was 
23 percent in July 2005. Although the 2.1 percent appreciation at the end of 2005 slightly 
reduced the degree of undervaluation, the speed of real appreciation was slowed down in 
2006 and 2007. 
Challenges under the Existing Currency Regime 
Although Chinese authority declared that the exchange rate was flexible, the 
renminbi was still floating within a small range. An increasing undervalued exchange rate, 
a rapid expanding current account surplus and the accelerating buildup of foreign 
exchange reserves pose several challenges for the Chinese government. 
A fixed exchange rate regime will impose constraints on a country’s monetary 
policy because the divergence between domestic interest rates and foreign rates will 
result in destabilizing capital flows. Theoretically, capital control can prevent large 
inflows or outflows. But it is difficult to maintain effective controls in practice. Even if 
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capital control can be implemented effectively, significant foreign exchange purchase 
will lead to an increase in the domestic money supply. If the government cannot sterilize 
the increase in money supply, inflation will become severe and the real exchange rate 
will appreciate. Meanwhile, the Chinese government needs to sell these huge quantities 
of sterilization bonds which will induce an interest rate increase (the central bank must 
pay on these bonds). Finally, that interest may exceed the earnings from the bank’s 
holdings of interest-bearing foreign currency-denominated financial assets, imposing a 
substantial financial constraint on sterilization operations (Morris Goldstein and Nicholas 
R. Lardy, “The Future of China’s Exchange Rate Policy”, p.28). Goldstein and Lardy 
argued that China’s fixed exchange rate already diminished the effectiveness of monetary 
policy and that this erosion is likely to continue. Thus increased currency flexibility is 
needed to reduce the risks of macroeconomic instability, whether of domestic or external 
origin (Goldstein and Lardy 2006b). When the central bank controlled the growth of 
monetary aggregates by imposing quotas on loans it led to an inefficient process.  Banks 
could only follow the “window guidance” on bank lending. This process was not led by 
the interest rate. Without the guidance of market signal, the allocation of credit may be 
less efficient. This school believed that the resultant policy mix left China with an interest 
rate structure that was far from optimum (Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy, “The 
Future of China’s Exchange Rate Policy”, p.29). On the lending side, real interest rates 
were low to fulfill a rapid development of the economy. Deposit rates were also very low 
on the saving side as well. For example, the ceiling that banks could pay on demand 
deposits in 2008 was 0.72 percent and on one-year deposits rate was 3.33 percent. Taking 
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into account the 7.9 percent inflation rate and a 5 percent tax on interest income, the real 
interest rate after tax was negative. Negative real returns on bank savings was the main 
factor which caused the boom in the residential property market. This periodic real estate 
booms heighten huge financial risks 
For a while after 1994, the exchange rate of renminbi fluctuated around RMB 8.3 to 
the dollar. This undervalued exchange rate caused China’s trade and current account 
surplus began to soar. The increase of foreign exchange reserves pushed government 
invest large amount of funds in developed countries. Unfortunately, the state investment 
in China was still immature. Huge foreign funds were lost due to improper investments.  
Another view on current renminbi exchange rate is that going much beyond the 
existing gradualist approach to currency reform would be too dangerous for the fragile 
banking system. Large appreciation of renminbi could induce serious currency 
mismatches for banks and their customers. Also, sharp appreciation of renminbi might 
reduce growth, making it harder to maintain the declining trend in banks’ nonperforming 
loans. China’s financial market has not been well developed. Financial infrastructure 
cannot offer market participants hedging instruments adequately to protect them against 
an increase in exchange rate volatility. Thus, the bolder currency reform should have a 
precondition: a more developed financial system. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INFLATION AND MONETARY POLICY 
Inflation in China after Economic Reform 
 
Figure 9 CPI from 1985 to 2008 
Year CPI 
1985 109.3 
1986 106.5 
1987 107.3 
1988 111.8 
1989 118.0 
1990 103.1 
1991 103.4 
1992 106.4 
1993 114.7 
1994 124.1 
1995 117.1 
1996 108.3 
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1997 102.8 
1998 99.2 
1999 98.6 
2000 100.4 
2001 100.7 
2002 99.2 
2003 101.2 
2004 103.9 
2005 101.8 
2006 101.5 
2007 104.8 
2008 105.9 
Table 12 CPI from 1985 to 2008 
As we can see in the Figure 9, the fluctuation of CPI was volatile before late 1990. 
Since 1990, China’s inflation has been low and stable. 
This dynamic variation in Chinese CPI inflation over the past three decades reflects 
changes in the mechanism of Chinese price formation and policy regimes. Before 1978, 
China had a fixed price system. In other words, prices of commodities were strictly 
administered by the government and changed infrequently. During the economic reform, 
the fixed price system was gradually liberalized. In 1979, the central government 
initialized a so-called “adjustment and reform” policy officially with the official goal of 
promoting fast development in both the industrial and agriculture sectors. Then the fixed 
price system was increasingly liberalized. The prices of industrial and agricultrual 
products increased dramatically in the early 1980s. This rise in the price level inevitably 
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passed through the production chain and induced high inflation. The growth rate of real 
output in the early 1980s was also at a high level in with the rapidly rising prices. 
However, countercyclical economic policies were not implemented efficiently and timely. 
Both growth rates of M2 and domestic credit still went up in late 1982. The growth rate 
reached 40% in 1985 and nearly 50% in 1986. The tightening credit policy in 1986 
dampened the inflation but just for a short period. Prices soared as high as 25% in 1988 
due to further liberalization and deregulation of prices. Then the central government 
immediately tightened money and credit supply and reduced fixed investment. The 
tightening policy lasted until the end of the 1980s. Although tightening policy cooled 
down the inflation and economic growth, it seemed to overcompensate. During 1988 to 
1989, the industrial sector suffered a serious reduction in activity, causing a relatively 
low level of both economic growth and inflation (below 5%) over the period 1990-1992. 
Deng Xiaoping’s “South China Tour Speech” in 1992 triggered a new round of fast 
Chinese economic growth. The central government again loosened credit control which 
led to a sharp increase in the economic growth rate and money supply. Inevitably, 
inflation started to increase in 1992 and peaked in 1994. Then the inflation rate decreased 
through 1995 and further decreased in the late 1990s because of the implementation of a 
number of tightening policy measures in 1994. Since the 1990s, China has experienced 
mild deflation twice, one in 1998-2000 and again in 2001-2003. The CPI started to grow 
in 2007 due to the increase in the price of raw materials, agriculture products, labor costs 
and real estate.  
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Figure 10 Fluctuation of CPI and GDP Growth Rate from 1985 to 2008 
As we can see in the Figure 10, the CPI was highly correlated with GDP growth rate. 
In years of high inflation, the Chinese economy also had a high economic growth rate. 
Yin Zongcheng also confirmed the viewpoint of the correlation between inflation rate and 
economic growth rate in The Study of Correlation between Inflation and Macroeconomic 
Fluctuation. He observed that: 
1. CPI would affect macroeconomic fluctuation and macroeconomic 
fluctuation could also affect CPI.  
2. Once CPI changed, it would affect the economy causing economic 
fluctuation immediately. But on the contrary, the response of CPI to 
economic fluctuation had a lag. 
There are some changes in the interaction between the price level and the economy 
worth mention. (1) At the beginning of economic reform, government implemented a 
very strict planning management. Both materials of production and living were deficient. 
Supply was severely insufficient. Consumption was inhibited for a long time. With the 
development of the economy, investment increased. The limit on consumption began to 
be released. As prices were deregulated, both investment needs and consumption needs 
affected the CPI tremendously. This situation has changed since 1997. Rapid 
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development in both quality and quantity of agricultural products and consumer goods 
helped the Chinese economy move to a comparatively surplus status. Then the influence 
of the insufficiency of supply on the CPI began to decrease. In the meantime, the impact 
of price deregulation on the CPI diminished. China started to loosen price control in 1978. 
This implementation caused an increase in the CPI. The deregulation of pricing for 
agricultural products and consumer goods had finished in 1997; the effect of price control 
on the CPI had been eliminated. (2) Since 1978, the Chinese economy has gradually 
transferred from being driven by consumption and investment economic development to 
being driven by consumption, investment and export economic development drive. As 
foreign-trade dependence increases, the overseas market demand plays an important role 
in GDP growth.  However, as Shedeng Huang and Yanqiu He show, this increased 
foreign-trade dependence did not affect the CPI significantly. (3) Consumption structure 
changed since economic reform. At the early stage of economic reform, consumption was 
composed of primarily, agricultural and consumer goods. The share of other consumption 
like real estate, medical and education increased after 1997. But the formula for the 
Chinese CPI cannot reflect all these consumptions, especially that of real estate, which is 
now experiencing a price boom.  
Inflation and Changes to Monetary Policy 
As we can see in Figure 10, China’s inflation was low and stable after 1997. 
Chengsi Zhang and Joel Clovis mentioned in “China Inflation Dynamics: Persistence and 
Policy Regimes”, this low inflation was very likely to be associated with policy regime 
shifts in China. First, the role of the PBOC as the central bank of China had been 
 85 
strengthened since the mid-1990s. Although the PBOC assumed its responsibility as a 
central bank in 1983, its role as a central bank was not legally confirmed until 1995. 
Since the PBOC began to have the ability to implement monetary policy, monetary policy 
implementation has gradually improved. The PBOC abolished the quota management of 
credit and implemented the assets-to-liabilities ratio management in 1998. In 1999, the 
PBOC set up nine regional branches to promote policy efficiency instead of branches at 
provincial and municipal levels.  
“ Since the end of the 1990s, the PBOC has adopted a composite measure of 
quantity-based (e.g. money supply) and price-based (e.g, interest rate) tools for 
implementing its policies, with the quantity-based tool being a predominant 
policy instrument. As such, the reforms over the last decade have been turning the 
PBOC into a more “traditional” central bank that relies on comprehensive tools to 
accomplish its ends in a more sufficient manner.” (Chengsi Zhang, Joel Clovis, 
“China Inflation Dynamics: Persistence and Policy Regimes”, p.379).  
There are two viewpoints: one is that China’s low inflation rate is a result of changes 
to monetary policy. People believe the PBOC has begun to stabilize inflation around a 
potential long-run target and has gained credibility with the public and it will continue to 
do so. Another viewpoint, like the interpretation found in the analysis of Stock and 
Watson (2007), is that the decline of inflation persistence may only reflect the fact that 
the nature of “shocks” has changed. If the first viewpoint is right, a better monetary 
policy has resulted in a better anchoring of inflation expectations. Mishkin (2007) argued 
that better monetary policy reduced inflation persistence by anchoring inflation 
expectations. Unlike the simple intervention during 1980s and 1990s, the PBOC has 
increased its commitment to price stability in both words and actions since the late 1990s. 
Compared with the sharp upswings and downswings during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
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preemptive strikes against the volatile movement of the inflation rate by the PBOC 
resulted in a low and stable inflation since the late 1990s. 
Policy Implication 
Response of Inflation to Structural Shock 
A very interesting finding is that the response of inflation in China to demand 
shock, supply shock, and monetary policy shock diminished more quickly over the post-
1997 period. Also, the responses of inflation to supply shock and monetary policy 
shocks seemed more striking than that of inflation to aggregate demand shock. In the 
pre-1997 period, it took about two years for inflation to revert to an equilibrium level 
when it has been perturbed by a supply or monetary policy shock. The “rebound” time 
span reduced from two years to one year after 1997. Also, the time span for inflation to 
return to a steady level following a disturbance in aggregate demand was reduced from 
four years to less than three years. This research suggests that, compared to a decade ago, 
the underlying shocks are less likely to induce serious economic instability today in 
China. However, this conclusion does not mean that the central bank should pay less 
attention to shocks and be confident that inflation rate will stay at a low level. As 
mentioned before, the comparatively low inflation after 1997 was mainly due to the 
improvement of monetary policy. Other factors can also spark inflation. As international 
trade become more and more important to the Chinese economy, the central government 
needs to keep an eye on both internal and external shocks. 
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Inflation Expectations and Inflation Control 
Recent studies conducted by Mishkin(2007) have pointed out that better monetary 
policy produced better anchors of inflation expectations which could lead to less 
persistent inflation. Before the late 1990s, as mentioned, monetary policy in China was 
inefficient and unsuccessful in controlling inflation. Poor inflation control resulted in 
poorly anchored inflation expectations. In the late 1980s, high inflation expectations in 
the future were strong because of the aggressive price liberalization. The inflation 
expectations have been much better anchored since the late 1990s due to better monetary 
policy.  
 
Figure 11 Chinese CPI Inflation and Survey of Inflation Expectations 
As we can see in Figure 11, most of the time, inflation expectations were lower than 
actual inflation. This also reaffirms the fact that the structural change in Chinese inflation 
is mainly attributed to better monetary policy and better anchoring of inflation 
expectations. But, as I mentioned, this does not mean that the central bank should pay 
less attention to shocks and be confident that the inflation rate will stay at a low level. 
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Other factors will still impact inflation. Since the recession of 2008, the Chinese 
government has launched expansionary monetary policy in conjunction with a proactive 
fiscal policy. At the time of my writing, China’s CPI has already reached 6.2% and 
doesn’t show signs of slowing. China still needs to make efforts to adjust its economic 
policy in order to improve its efficiency during the reaction to economic shocks. Aside 
from the monetary steps against internal and external shocks, China still needs to improve 
the flexibility of its exchange rate regime in order to have a better international economic 
environment. A comparatively flexible exchange rate system can reduce economic 
shocks to some extent. First, exchange rate flexibility can help the government prevent 
large foreign exchange reserve loss or surplus because it no longer has the duty to 
maintain a specific exchange rate. When the renminbi appreciates, the central bank does 
not need to sell yuan and buy dollars to stabilize the renminbi value.  Exchange rate 
flexibility can balance the payment. The exchange rate is affected by market conditions. 
If a country is experiencing a serious balance of payments deficit, its currency will 
depreciate and vice versa. Through such mechanisms, exchange flexibility can decrease 
government’s dependence on direct intervention and increase the efficiency of resource 
allocation. Third, exchange rate flexibility can cushion the blow of hot money. In the 
fixed exchange rate system, the nominal exchange rate likely deviates from the 
equilibrium exchange rate. If the currency is undervalued and facing appreciation 
pressure, hot money will largely be transferred to the country for speculative purpose. For 
example, the RMB has been devaluated in the last few years, and an enormous amount of 
international floating capital has flooded the Chinese market which increased the pressure 
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of RMB’s appreciation. Exchange rate flexibility can prevent serious deviation between 
the actual exchange rate and the equilibrium exchange rate. These mechanisms decrease 
the possibility of international capital attack. Fourth, flexibility of the exchange rate can 
minimize the transmission of economic fluctuation and inflation. Countries which have a 
high degree of trade dependence are easily affected by inflation and economic 
fluctuations of their trading partners under a fixed exchange rate system. On the contrary, 
under a floating exchange rate system, if a country suffers serious inflation, the currency 
will depreciate. The increased domestic currency price of export goods will be largely 
offset by the depreciation of currency. As a result, the price of export goods in foreign 
currencies will not change too much. So, the trading partners incur less price pressure. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
There has been more than 30 years since economic reform. Impressive economic 
development has taken place over these 30 years. The Chinese economy has gradually 
transferred from a planned economy to a market economy. In Chapter Two, I illustrated 
all five business cycles which have occurred over the past 30 years. Chapter Three 
mainly focuses on China’s financial background, including institutional condition, 
banking system, economic reform and existing problems. This background introduction 
gives a clearer picture of China’s financial situation and implementation of monetary 
policy. I also analyzed some aspects of China’s monetary policy such as the credit plan, 
interest rate, and exchange rate and discussed China’s inflation situation and some 
relevant monetary policy decisions. Compare to business cycles before economic reform, 
we find that the business cycles after 1978 were much more stable and lasted longer and 
the period became longer. Although the Chinese economy is developing quickly, it still 
faces many issues. Compared with developed countries like the United States, 
government intervention is much more frequent in China. Business cycles in China are 
more like “policy-induced growth cycles”. The Chinese government wants to stimulate 
economic growth so it artificially expands the credit. Investment then increases as well. 
But significant investment leads to an overheated economy. In order to control the 
overheated economy and inflation, government tightens the fiscal and monetary policy to 
drag the economy back to a normal status. When the economy depresses, this process 
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starts again. Also, in China, the PBOC determines both central bank rates and bank rates 
instead of letting banking institutions determine their own interest rate. Banks must use 
the benchmark loan and deposit rate while conducting business. All working capital loans 
and fixed assets loans have the same interest rate, despite difference in industry and profit 
rate. High- profit borrowers and low- profit borrowers have the same interest rate which 
induces concerning imbalances. Since the decentralization of the government, local 
governments always expand credit because they are eager to see high-speed economic 
development. As a result, the PBOC has more has more difficulty controlling the 
availability of credit without over-stimulating the whole economy because the objective 
of monetary policy is subordinate to government’s economic development target. The 
PBOC has the responsibility to cooperate with government to achieve the economic 
target. Then the policy induced growth cycle starts and inflation rises. Once inflation 
reaches a high level, government must use monetary policy to constrain credit and lower 
the inflation rate which causes the economy to decline. 
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